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Abstract
We consider the design of computationally efficient online learning algorithms in an adversarial
setting in which the learner has access to an offline optimization oracle. We present an algorithm called
Generalized Follow-the-Perturbed-Leader and provide conditions under which it is oracle-efficient while
achieving vanishing regret. Our algorithm generalizes the Follow-the-Perturbed-Leader (FTPL) approach
of Kalai and Vempala [32] in which the action with the highest randomly perturbed historical perfor-
mance is chosen on each round. FTPL is inefficient when the number of actions is exponential in the
parameters of interest. Our algorithm creates more compact perturbations by augmenting the observed
history with randomly generated synthetic history, and choosing the action with the (near) best perfor-
mance on this augmented history. As we show, when certain structural properties hold, the augmented
history is of polynomial size even when the learner’s action space is exponential, yielding oracle-efficient
learning. Our results make significant progress on an open problem raised by Hazan and Koren [27], who
showed that oracle-efficient algorithms do not exist in general [26] and asked whether one can identify
properties under which oracle-efficient online learning may be possible.
Our second main contribution is the introduction of a new adversarial online auction-design frame-
work for revenue maximization and the application of our oracle-efficient learning results to the adaptive
design of auctions. In our framework, a seller repeatedly sells an item or set of items to a population
of buyers by adaptively selecting auctions from a fixed target class. The goal of the seller is to leverage
historical bid data to pick an auction on each iteration in such a way that the seller’s overall revenue
compares favorably with the revenue he would have obtained using the best auction from the class
in hindsight. Since this is a specific case of adversarial online learning, we can apply our framework
and provide new oracle-efficient learning results for: (1) Vickrey-Clarkes-Groves (VCG) auctions with
bidder-specific reserves in single-parameter settings, (2) envy-free item pricing in multi-item auctions,
and (3) the level auctions of Morgenstern and Roughgarden [37] for single-item settings. The last result
leads to an approximation of the overall optimal Myerson auction when bidders’ valuations are drawn
according to a fast-mixing Markov process, extending prior work that only gave such guarantees for the
i.i.d. setting.
Finally, we derive various extensions, including: (1) oracle-efficient algorithms for the contextual
learning setting in which the learner has access to side information (such as bidder demographics), (2)
learning with approximate oracles such as those based on Maximal-in-Range algorithms, and (3) no-
regret bidding in simultaneous auctions, resolving an open problem of Daskalakis and Syrgkanis [13].
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1 Introduction
Online learning plays a major role in the adaptive optimization of computer systems, from the design of on-
line marketplaces [3, 5, 8, 44] to the optimization of routing schemes in communication networks [2]. The
environments in these applications are constantly evolving, requiring continued adaptation of these systems.
Online learning algorithms have been designed to robustly address this challenge, with performance guar-
antees that hold even when the environment is adversarial. However, the information-theoretically optimal
learning algorithms that work with arbitrary learner action spaces are computationally inefficient when the
action space is exponential in the natural problem representation [18]. For certain action spaces and envi-
ronments, efficient online learning algorithms can be designed by reducing the online learning problem to
an optimization problem [2, 25, 30, 32]. However, these approaches do not easily extend to the complex
and highly non-linear problems faced by real learning systems, such as the learning systems used in online
market design. In this paper, we address the problem of efficient online learning with an exponentially large
action space under arbitrary learner objectives.
This goal is not achievable without some assumptions on the problem structure. Since an online opti-
mization problem is at least as hard as the corresponding offline optimization problem [7, 13], a minimal
assumption is the existence of an algorithm that returns a near-optimal solution to the offline problem. We
assume, without loss of generality, that our learner has access to such an offline algorithm, which we call an
offline optimization oracle. This oracle, for any (weighted) history of choices by the environment, returns an
action of the learner that (approximately) maximizes the learner’s reward. We seek to design oracle-efficient
learners, that is, learners that run in polynomial time, with each oracle call counting O(1).
An oracle-efficient learning algorithm can be viewed as a reduction from the online to the offline prob-
lem, providing conditions under which the online problem is not only as hard, but also as easy as the offline
problem, and thereby offering computational equivalence between online and offline optimization. Apart
from theoretical significance, reductions from online to offline optimization are also practically important.
For example, if one has already developed and implemented a Bayesian optimization procedure which op-
timizes against a static stochastic environment, then our algorithm offers a black-box transformation of that
procedure into an adaptive optimization algorithm with provable learning guarantees in non-stationary, non-
stochastic environments. Even if the existing optimization system does not run in worst-case polynomial
time, but is rather a well-performing fast heuristic, a reduction to offline optimization will leverage any ex-
pert domain knowledge that went into designing the heuristic, as well as any further improvements of the
heuristic or even discovery of polynomial-time solutions.
Recent work of Hazan and Koren [26] shows that oracle-efficient learning in adversarial environments
is not achievable in general, while leaving as open the problem of identifying the properties under which
oracle-efficient online learning may be possible [27]. Specifically, we introduce a generic algorithm called
Generalized Follow-the-Perturbed-Leader (Generalized FTPL) and derive sufficient conditions under which
this algorithm yields oracle-efficient online learning. Our results are enabled by providing a new way of
adding regularization so as to stabilize optimization algorithms in general optimization settings. The lat-
ter could be of independent interest beyond online learning. Our approach unifies and extends previous
approaches to oracle-efficient learning, including the Follow-the-Perturbed Leader (FTPL) approach in-
troduced by Kalai and Vempala [32] for linear objective functions, and its generalizations to submodular
objective functions [25], adversarial contextual learning [45], and learning in simultaneous second-price
auctions [13]. Furthermore, our sufficient conditions draw a strong connection between the notion of a uni-
versal identification set of Goldman et al. [19] and oracle-efficient learnability.
The second main contribution of our work is to introduce a new framework for the problem of adap-
tive auction design for revenue maximization and to demonstrate the power of Generalized FTPL through
several applications in this framework. Traditional auction theory assumes that the valuations of the bid-
ders are drawn from a population distribution which is known, thereby leading to a Bayesian optimization
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problem. The knowledge of the distribution by the seller is a strong assumption. Recent work in algorithmic
mechanism design [12, 14, 37, 43] relaxes this assumption by solely assuming access to a set of samples
from the distribution. In this work, we drop any distributional assumptions and introduce the adversarial
learning framework of online auction design. On each round, a learner adaptively designs an auction rule
for the allocation of a set of resources to a fresh set of bidders from a population.1 The goal of the learner
is to achieve average revenue at least as large as the revenue of the best auction from some target class. Un-
like the standard approach to auction design, initiated by the seminal work of Myerson [38], our approach
is devoid of any assumptions about a prior distribution on the valuations of the bidders for the resources
at sale. Instead, similar to an agnostic approach in learning theory, we incorporate prior knowledge in the
form of a target class of auction schemes that we want to compete with. This is especially appropriate when
the auctioneer is restricted to using a particular design of auctions with power to make only a few design
choices, such as deciding the reserve prices in a second price auction. A special case of our framework is
considered in the recent work of Roughgarden and Wang [44]. They study online learning of the class of
single-item second-price auctions with bidder-specific reserves, and give an algorithm with performance that
approaches a constant factor of the optimal revenue in hindsight. We go well beyond this specific setting and
show that our Generalized FTPL can be used to optimize over several standard classes of auctions including
VCG auctions with bidder-specific reserves and the level auctions of Morgenstern and Roughgarden [37],
achieving low additive regret to the best auction in the class.
In the remainder of this section, we describe our main results in more detail and then discuss several ex-
tensions and applications of these results, including (1) learning with side information (i.e., contextual learn-
ing); (2) learning with constant-factor approximate oracles (e.g., using Maximal-in-Range algorithms [39]);
(3) regret bounds with respect to stronger benchmarks for the case in which the environment is not com-
pletely adversarial but follows a fast-mixing Markov process.
Our work contributes to two major lines of work on the design of efficient and oracle-efficient online
learning algorithms [1, 13, 16, 25, 26, 30, 32, 42, 46] and the design of auctions using machine learning
tools [5, 8, 12, 14, 33, 37]. We describe these and additional related work in more detail in Appendix A.
1.1 Oracle-Efficient Learning with Generalized FTPL
We consider the following online learning problem. On each round t = 1, . . . , T , a learner chooses an action
xt from a finite set X , and an adversary chooses an action yt from a set Y . The learner then observes yt and
receives a payoff f(xt, yt) ∈ [0, 1], where the function f is fixed and known to the learner. The goal of the
learner is to obtain low expected regret with respect to the best action in hindsight, i.e., to minimize
REGRET := E
[
max
x∈X
T∑
t=1
f(x, yt)−
T∑
t=1
f(xt, yt)
]
,
where the expectation is over the randomness of the learner.2 We desire algorithms, called no-regret algo-
rithms, for which this regret is sublinear in the time horizon T .
Our algorithm takes its name from the seminal Follow-The-Perturbed-Leader (FTPL) algorithm of Kalai
and Vempala [32]. FTPL achieves low regret, O(
√
T log(|X |), by independently perturbing the historical
payoff of each of the learner’s actions and choosing on each round the action with the highest perturbed pay-
off. However, this approach is inefficient when the action space is exponential in the natural representation
1Equivalently, the set of bidders on each round can be the same as long as they are myopic and optimize their utility separately
in each round. Using our extension to contextual learning (Section 5), this approach can also be applied when the learner’s choice
of auction is allowed to depend on features of the arriving set of bidders, such as demographic information.
2To simplify exposition, we assume that the adversary is oblivious, i.e., that the sequence y1, . . . , yT is chosen in advance,
though our results generalize to adaptive adversaries using standard techniques [13, 29].
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of the learning problem, because it requires creating |X | independent random variables.3 Moreover, because
of the form of the perturbation, the optimization of the perturbed payoffs cannot be performed by the of-
fline optimization oracle for the same problem, but instead it requires a “perturbed” optimization oracle. We
overcome both of these challenges by, first, generalizing FTPL to work with perturbations that can be com-
pactly represented and are thus not necessarily independent across different actions (sharing randomness),
and, second, by implementing such perturbations via synthetic histories of adversary actions (implementing
randomness).
Sharing randomness Our Generalized FTPL begins by drawing a random vector α ∈ RN of some small
size N , with components αj drawn independently from a dispersed distribution D. The payoff of each of
the learner’s actions is perturbed by a linear combination of these independent variables, as prescribed by
a perturbation translation matrix Γ of size |X | × N , with entries in [0, 1]. Let Γx denote the row of Γ
corresponding to x. On each round t, the algorithm outputs an action xt that (approximately) maximizes the
perturbed historical performance. In other words, xt is chosen such that for all x ∈ X ,
t−1∑
τ=1
f(xt, yτ ) + α · Γxt ≥
t−1∑
τ=1
f(x, yτ ) + α · Γx − 
for some fixed optimization accuracy  ≥ 0. See Algorithm 1 in Section 2 for a full specification.
We show that Generalized FTPL is no-regret as long as  is sufficiently small and the translation matrix
Γ satisfies an admissibility condition. This condition requires the rows of Γ to be (sufficiently) distinct so
that each action’s perturbation uses a different weighted combination of the low-dimensional noise. To the
best of our knowledge, the approach of using an arbitrary matrix to induce shared randomness among actions
of the learner is novel. See Theorem 2.5 for a formal statement of this result.
Informal Theorem 1.1. A translation matrix is (κ, δ)-admissible if any two rows of the matrix are distinct,
the number of different values within a column is at most κ, and the minimum non-zero difference between
any two values within a column is at least δ. Generalized FTPL with a (κ, δ)-admissible matrix Γ and an
appropriate uniform distribution as D achieves regret O(N
√
Tκ/δ + T ).
A technical challenge here is to show that the randomness induced by Γ on the set of actionsX stabilizes
the algorithm, i.e., the probability that xt 6= xt+1 is small. We use the admissibility of Γ to guide us
through the analysis of stability. In particular, we consider how each column of Γ partitions actions of X
to a few subsets (at most κ) based on their corresponding entries in that column. Admissibility implies that
the algorithm is stable as a whole, if for each column the partition to which an action belongs remains
the same with probability close to 1. This allows us to decompose the stability analysis of the algorithm
as a whole to the analysis of stability across partitions of each column. At the column level, stability of
the partition between two time-steps follows by showing that a switch between partitions happens only if
the perturbation αj corresponding to that column falls into a small sub-interval of its support. The latter
probability is small if the distribution is sufficiently dispersed. This final argument is similar in nature to the
reason why perturbations lead to stability in the original FTPL algorithm of [32].
Implementing randomness To ensure oracle-efficient learning, we additionally need the property that the
induced action-level perturbations can be simulated by a (short) synthetic history of adversary actions. This
allows us to avoid working with Γ directly, or even explicitly writing it down. This requirement is captured
by our implementability condition, which states that each column of the translation matrix essentially corre-
sponds to a scaled version of the expected reward of the learner on some distribution of adversary actions.
See Theorem 2.9 for a formal statement of this result.
3 If payoffs are linear in some low-dimensional representation of X then the number of variables needed is equal to this
dimension. But for non-linear payoffs, |X | variables are required.
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Informal Theorem 1.2. A translation matrix is implementable if each column corresponds to a scaled
version of the expected reward of the learner against some small-supported distribution of actions of the
adversary. Generalized FTPL with an implementable translation matrix can be implemented with one or-
acle call per round and running time polynomial in N , T , and the size of the support of the distribution
implementing the translation matrix. Oracle calls count O(1) in the running time.
For some learning problems, it is easier to first construct an implementable translation matrix and ar-
gue about its admissibility; for others, it is easier to construct an admissible matrix and argue about its
implementability. We will see examples of each in the applications below, exhibiting the versatility of our
conditions.
The following is one consequence of our theorems that is particularly useful for obtaining oracle-efficient
no-regret algorithms (see Theorems 2.5 and 2.9 for more general statements):
If there existN adversary actions such that any pair of learner’s actions yields different rewards
for at least one of these N actions, then Generalized FTPL has regret O(N
√
T/δ) and runs in
time poly(N,T ) where δ is the smallest difference between distinct rewards on any one of the
N actions.
The aforementioned results establish a reduction from online optimization to offline optimization. When
the offline optimization problem can indeed be solved in polynomial time, these results imply that the online
optimization problem can also be solved in polynomial time. See Corollary 2.10 for the associated runtime.
1.2 Main Application: Online Auction Design
In many applications of auction theory, including electronic marketplaces, a seller repeatedly sells an item
or a set of items to a population of buyers, with a few arriving for each auction. In such cases, the seller
can optimize his auction design in an online manner, using historical data consisting of observed bids. We
consider a setting in which the seller would like to use this historical data to select an auction from a fixed
target class. For example, a seller in sponsored-search auctions might be limited by practical constraints to
consider only second-price auctions with bidder-specific reserves. The seller can optimize the revenue by
using the historical data for each bidder to set these reserves. Similarly, a seller on eBay may be restricted
to set a single reserve price for each item. Here, the seller can optimize the revenue by using historical data
from auctions for similar goods to set the reserves for new items. In both cases, the goal is to leverage the
historical data to pick an auction on each round in such a way that the seller’s overall revenue compares
favorably with the optimal auction from the target class.
More formally, on round t = 1, . . . , T , n bidders arrive with a vector of bids (or equivalently, valuations,
since we assume the auctions used are truthful) vt ∈ Vn. We allow these valuations to be arbitrary, e.g.,
chosen by an adversary. Prior to observing the bids, the auctioneer commits to an auction at from a class of
truthful auctions A. The goal of the auctioneer is to achieve a revenue that, in hindsight, is very close to the
revenue that would have been achieved by the best fixed auction in class A if that auction were used on all
rounds. In other words, the auctioneer aims to minimize the expected regret
E
[
max
a∈A
T∑
t=1
Rev(a,vt)−
T∑
t=1
Rev(at,vt)
]
,
where Rev(a,v) is the revenue of auction a on bid profile v and the expectation is over the actions of the
auctioneer.
This problem can easily be cast in our oracle-efficient online learning framework. The learner’s action
space is the set of target auctions A, while the adversary’s action space is the set of bid or valuation vectors
Vn. Finally, the offline oracle is a revenue maximization oracle which computes an (approximately) optimal
4
Auction Class Regret Oracle-Based Complexity Section
VCG with bidder-specific reserves, s-unit O(ns log(T )
√
T ) O(nT 3/2 log(T )) 3.1
envy free k-item pricing O(nk log(T )
√
T ) O(nT 3/2 log(T )) 3.2
level auction with discretization level m O(nm2
√
T ) O(nm2T ) 3.3
Table 1: Regret bounds and oracle-based computational efficiency, for the auction classes considered in this
work for n bidders and time horizon T . All our results perform a single oracle call per iteration.
auction within the class A given a set of valuation vectors. Using the Generalized FTPL with appropriate
matrices Γ, we provide the first oracle-efficient no-regret algorithms for several commonly studied auction
classes:
– Vickrey-Clarkes-Groves (VCG) auctions with bidder-specific reserve prices in single-dimensional
matroid auction settings, which are known to achieve half the revenue of the optimal auction in i.i.d.
settings under some conditions [24];
– envy-free item pricing mechanisms in combinatorial markets with unlimited supply, often studied in
the static Bayesian setting [3, 20];
– single-item level auctions, introduced by Morgenstern and Roughgarden [37], who show that these
auctions approximate, to an arbitrary accuracy, the Myerson auction [38], which is known to be opti-
mal for the Bayesian independent-private-value setting.
The crux of our approach is designing admissible and implementable matrices. In the case of VCG with
bidder-specific reserves and envy-free item pricing auctions, we show how one can implement an (obviously
admissible) matrix Γ, where each row corresponds to the concatenation of the binary representations of the
reserves of each bidder or the prices of each item, respectively. We show that, surprisingly, any perturbation
on the auction revenues that is a linear function of this bit representation can be simulated by a distribution
of bidder valuations (see Figure 1 for an example such construction). For the case of level auctions, our
challenge is to show that an (obviously implementable) matrix Γ whose columns refer to a specific small
subset of bid profiles is admissible. The hard part of this construction is identifying a small set of bidder
valuation vectors, such that any two different level auctions yield different revenues on at least one of these
valuation vectors.
Table 1 summarizes the regret of our oracle-efficient algorithms, as well as the computational efficiency
assuming oracle calls take O(1) computation. All our results perform a single oracle call per iteration, so T
oracle calls in total. Note that these results demonstrate an efficient reduction from the online problem to the
offline problem.
While in theory, the auction classes discussed in this table do not have a worst-case polynomial time
algorithm for solving the offline problem, in practice there are fast running algorithms, e.g., highly optimized
Integer Program solvers, that can perform these computations. Hence, the key practical appeal of online to
offline reduction is the fact that it enables one to tap into such existing routines that are designed to find
an optimal auction on historical data, at almost no additional cost. Nevertheless, in some cases one may
only be interested in using polynomial time algorithms, even if the solutions they provide are sub-optimal.
Therefore, we extend our framework to work with some classes of multiplicative approximation oracles, i.e.,
oracles that only return an action whose performance is within a constant factor of the performance of the
optimal action in class. As a concrete example of the power of such methods, we provide a fully efficient
polynomial time online algorithm for the problem of online Welfare Maximization in multi-unit auctions
using an offline approximation algorithm. See the extensions for an overview of these results.
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1.3 Extensions and Additional Applications
In Sections 4-7, we present several extensions and additional applications of our results. See Table 2 for a
summary.
Markovian Adversaries and Competing with the Optimal Auction (Section 4). Morgenstern and Rough-
garden [37] show that level auctions can provide an arbitrarily accurate approximation to the overall optimal
Myerson auction in the Bayesian single-item auction setting if the values of the bidders are drawn from
independent distributions and i.i.d. across time. Therefore, if the environment in an online setting picks bid-
der valuations from independent distributions, standard online-to-batch reductions imply that the revenue of
Generalized FTPL with the class of level auctions is close to the overall optimal (i.e., not just best-in-class)
single-shot auction. We generalize this reasoning and show the same strong optimality guarantee when the
valuations of bidders on each round are drawn from a fast-mixing Markov process that is independent across
bidders but Markovian over rounds. For this setting, our results give an oracle-efficient algorithm with regret
O(n1/5T 9/10) to the overall optimal auction, rather than just best-in-class. This is the first result on compet-
ing with the Myerson optimal auction for non-i.i.d. distributions, as all prior work [12, 14, 37, 43] assumes
i.i.d. samples.
Contextual Learning (Section 5). In this setting, on each round t the learner observes a context σt before
choosing an action. For example, in online auction design, the context might represent demographic infor-
mation about the set of bidders. The goal of the learner is to compete with the best policy in some fixed class,
where each policy is a mapping from a context σt to an action. We propose a contextual extension of the
translation matrix Γ. Generalized FTPL can be applied using this extended translation matrix and provides
sublinear regret bounds for both the case in which there is a small “separator” of the policy class and the
transductive setting in which the set of all possible contexts is known ahead of time. Our results extend and
generalize the results of Syrgkanis et al. [45] from contextual combinatorial optimization to any learning
setting that admits an implementable and admissible translation matrix.
The contextual-learning extension is of particular interest to online auction design because it allows the
learner to use any side information known about the bidders before they place their bids to improve the
choice of auction. Although, typically, no two sets of bidders in the population are identical, the learner can
utilize the side information to design a common treatment for bidders that are similar, that is, to generalize
across a population.
Our performance guarantees for adaptive auction design, similar to much prior work, rely on the as-
sumption that the bidders are either myopic or are different on each round. One criticism of this assumption
is that such adaptive mechanisms might be manipulated by strategic bidders who distort their bids so as to
gain in the future. The contextual learning algorithms mitigate this risk by pooling similar bidders, which
reduces the probability that the exact same bidder will be overly influential in the choices of the algorithm.
Approximate Oracles and Approximate Regret (Section 6). For some problems there might not exist
a sufficiently fast (e.g., polynomial-time or FPTAS) offline oracle with small additive error as we require.
To make our results more applicable in practice, we extend them to handle oracles that are required only
to return an action with performance that is within a constant multiplicative factor, C ≤ 1, of that of the
optimal action in the class. We consider two examples of such oracles: Relaxation-based Approximations
(see, e.g., [3]) and Maximal-in-Range (MIR) algorithms [39]. Our results hold in both cases with a modified
version of regret, called C-regret, in which the online algorithm competes with C times the payoff of the
optimal action in hindsight.
Additional Applications (Section 7). Finally, we provide further applications of our work in the area of
online combinatorial optimization with MIR approximate oracles, and in the area of no-regret learning for
bid optimization in simultaneous second-price auctions.
– In the first application, we give a polynomial-time learning algorithm for online welfare maximization
6
Problem Class Regret Section Notes
Markovian, single item O(n1/5T 9/10) 4.2 competes with Myerson optimal auction
contextual online auction4 O(
√
T ) or O(T 3/4) 5 incorporates bidders’ side information
welfare maximization, s-unit5 1/2-regret: O(n4
√
T ) 7.1 fully polynomial-time algorithm
bidding in SiSPAs, k items O(km
√
T ) 7.2 solves an open problem of [13]
Table 2: Additional results considered in Sections 4-7 and their significance. Above, m is the discretization
level of the problems, n is the number of bidders, and T is the time horizon.
in multi-unit auctions that achieves 1/2-regret, by invoking the polynomial-time MIR approximation
algorithm of Dobzinski and Nisan [15] as an offline oracle.
– In the second application, we solve an open problem raised in the recent work of Daskalakis and
Syrgkanis [13], who offered efficient learning algorithms only for the weaker benchmark of no-envy
learning, rather than no-regret learning, in simultaneous second-price auctions, and left as an open
question the existence of oracle efficient no-regret algorithms. We show that no-regret learning in
simultaneous item auctions is efficiently achievable, assuming access to an optimal bidding oracle
against a known distribution of opponents bids (equiv, against a distribution of item prices).
2 Generalized FTPL and Oracle-Efficient Online Learning
In this section, we introduce the Generalized Follow-the-Perturbed-Leader (Generalized FTPL) algorithm
and describe the conditions under which it efficiently reduces online learning to offline optimization.
As described in Section 1.1, we consider the following online learning problem. On each round t =
1, . . . , T , a learner chooses an action xt from a finite set X , and an adversary chooses an action yt from a
set Y , which is not necessarily finite. The learner then observes yt and receives a payoff f(xt, yt) ∈ [0, 1],
where the function f is fixed and known to the learner. The goal of the learner is to obtain low expected
regret with respect to the best action in hindsight, i.e., to minimize
REGRET := E
[
max
x∈X
T∑
t=1
f(x, yt)−
T∑
t=1
f(xt, yt)
]
,
where the expectation is over the randomness of the learner. An online algorithm is called a no-regret algo-
rithm if its regret is sublinear in T , which means that its per-round regret goes to 0 as T →∞. To simplify
exposition, we assume that the adversary is oblivious, i.e., that the sequence y1, . . . , yT is chosen up front
without knowledge of the learner’s realized actions. Our results generalize to adaptive adversaries using
standard techniques [13, 29].
A natural first attempt at an online learning algorithm with oracle access would be one that simply
invokes the oracle on the historical data at each round and plays the best action in hindsight. In a stochas-
tic environment in which the adversary’s actions are drawn i.i.d. from a fixed distribution on each round,
this Follow-the-Leader approach achieves a regret of O(
√
T log |X |). However, because the algorithm is
deterministic, it performs poorly in adversarial environments (see e.g., [6]).
To achieve sublinear regret, we use a common scheme, introduced by Kalai and Vempala [32], and
optimize over a perturbed objective at each round. Indeed, our algorithm takes its name from Kalai and
Vempala’s Follow-the-Perturbed-Leader (FTPL) algorithm. Unlike FTPL, we do not generate a separate in-
dependent perturbation for each action, because this creates the two problems mentioned in Section 1.1.
4The two regret bounds omit dependence on other parameters and are for the small separator setting and the transductive setting
respectively. See Section 5 for details.
5The regime of interest in this problem is s n. Note that our regret is independent of s in this case.
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First, FTPL for unstructured payoffs requires creating |X | independent random variables, which is in-
tractably large in many applications, including the auction design setting considered here. Second, FTPL
yields optimization problems that require a stronger offline optimizer than assumed here. We overcome the
first problem by working with perturbations that are not necessarily independent across different actions
(prior instances of such an approach were known only for online linear [32] and submodular [25] minimiza-
tion). We address the second problem by implementing such perturbations with synthetic historical samples
of adversary actions; this idea was introduced by Daskalakis and Syrgkanis [13], but they did not provide
a method of randomly generating such samples in general learning settings. Thus, our work unifies and
extends these previous lines of research.
We create shared randomness among actions in X by drawing a random vector α ∈ RN of some small
size N , with components αj drawn independently from a dispersed distribution D. The payoff of each of
the learner’s actions is perturbed by a linear combination of these independent variables, as prescribed by a
perturbation translation matrix Γ of size |X |×N , with entries in [0, 1]. The rows of Γ, denoted Γx, describe
the linear combination for each action x. That is, on each round t, the payoff of each learner action x ∈ X is
perturbed by α ·Γx, and our Generalized FTPL algorithm outputs an action x that approximately maximizes∑t−1
τ=1 f(x, yτ ) + α · Γx. See Algorithm 1 for a full specification. (For non-oblivious adversaries, a fresh
random vector α is drawn in each round.)
Algorithm 1: Generalized FTPL
Input: non-negative matrix Γ ∈ [0, 1]|X |×N , distribution D, and optimization accuracy parameter .
Draw αj ∼ D for j = 1, . . . , N
for t = 1, . . . , T do
Choose any xt such that for all x ∈ X ,
t−1∑
τ=1
f(xt, yτ ) + α · Γxt ≥
t−1∑
τ=1
f(x, yτ ) + α · Γx − 
Observe yt and receive payoff f(xt, yt)
end for
In the remainder of this section, we analyze the properties of matrix Γ that guarantee that Generalized
FTPL is no-regret and that its perturbations can be efficiently transformed into synthetic history. Together
these properties give rise to efficient reductions of online learning to offline optimization.
2.1 Regret Analysis
To analyze Generalized FTPL, we first bound its regret by the sum of a stability term, a perturbation term,
and an error term in the following lemma. While this approach is standard [32], we include a proof in
Appendix G for completeness.
Lemma 2.1 (-FTPL Lemma). For Generalized FTPL, we have
REGRET ≤ E
[
T∑
t=1
f(xt+1, yt)− f(xt, yt)
]
+ E [α · (Γx1 − Γx∗)] + T (1)
where x∗ = arg maxx∈X
∑T
t=1 f(x, yt).
In this lemma, the first term measures the stability of the algorithm, i.e., how often the action changes
from round to round. The second term measures the strength of the perturbation, that is, how much the
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perturbation amount differs between the best action and the initial action. The third term measures the
aggregated approximation error in choosing xt that only approximately optimizes
∑t−1
τ=1 f(x, yτ ) +α ·Γx.
To bound the stability term, we require that the matrix Γ be admissible and the distribution D be dis-
persed in the following sense.
Definition 2.2 ((κ, δ)-Admissible Translation Matrix). A translation matrix Γ is admissible if its rows are
distinct. It is (κ, δ)-admissible if it is admissible and also:
1. the number of distinct elements within each column is at most κ,
2. distinct elements within each column differ by at least δ.
Definition 2.3 ((ρ, L)-Dispersed Distribution). A distribution D on the real line is (ρ, L)-dispersed if for
any interval of length L, the probability measure placed by D on this interval is at most ρ.
In the next lemma, we bound the stability term in Equation (1) by showing that with high probability,
for all rounds t, we have xt+1 = xt. At a high level, since all rows of an admissible matrix Γ are distinct,
it suffices to show that the probability that Γxt+1 6= Γxt is small. We prove this for each coordinate Γxt+1j
separately, by showing that it is only possible to have Γxt+1j 6= Γxtj when the random variable αj falls in a
small interval, which happens with only small probability for a sufficiently dispersed distribution D.
Lemma 2.4. Consider Generalized FTPL with a (κ, δ)-admissible matrix Γ withN columns and a
(
ρ, 1+2δ
)
-
dispersed distribution D. Then, E
[∑T
t=1 f(xt+1, yt)− f(xt, yt)
]
≤ 2TNκρ.
Proof. Fix any t ≤ T . The bulk of the proof will establish that, with high probability, Γxt+1 = Γxt , which
by admissibility implies that xt+1 = xt and therefore f(xt+1, yt)− f(xt, yt) = 0.
Fix any j ≤ N . We first show that Γxt+1j = Γxtj with high probability. Let V denote the set of values
that appear in the jth column of Γ. For any value v ∈ V , let xv be any action that maximizes the perturbed
cumulative payoff among those whose Γ entry in the jth column equals v:
xv ∈ arg max
x∈X : Γxj=v
[
t−1∑
τ=1
f(x, yτ ) + α · Γx
]
= arg max
x∈X : Γxj=v
[
t−1∑
τ=1
f(x, yτ ) + α · Γx − αjv
]
.
For any v, v′ ∈ V , define
∆vv′ =
(
t−1∑
τ=1
f(xv, yτ ) + α · Γxv − αjv
)
−
(
t−1∑
τ=1
f(xv
′
, yτ ) + α · Γxv′ − αjv′
)
.
Note that xv and ∆vv′ are independent of αj , as we removed the payoff perturbation corresponding to αj .
If Γxtj = v, then by the -optimality of xt on the perturbed cumulative payoff, we have αj(v
′−v)−  ≤
∆vv′ for all v′ ∈ V . Suppose Γxt+1j = v′ 6= v. Then by the -optimality of xt+1, we have
t−1∑
τ=1
f(xv
′
, yτ ) + f(x
v′ , yt) + α · Γxv′ ≥
t−1∑
τ=1
f(xv, yτ ) + f(x
v, yt) + α · Γxv − .
Rearranging, we obtain for this same v′ that
∆vv′ ≤ αj(v′ − v) + f(xv′ , yt)− f(xv, yt) +  ≤ αj(v′ − v) + 1 + .
If v′ > v, then
αj ≥ ∆vv′ − 1− 
v′ − v ≥ minvˆ∈V, vˆ>v
∆vvˆ − 1− 
vˆ − v
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and so αj(v − v) + 1 +  ≥ ∆vv where v is the value of vˆ minimizing the expression on the right. Thus, in
this case we have − ≤ ∆vv − αj(v − v) ≤ 1 + . Similarly, if v′ < v, then
αj ≤ ∆vv′ − 1− 
v′ − v ≤ maxvˆ∈V, vˆ<v
∆vvˆ − 1− 
vˆ − v
and so αj(v − v) + 1 +  ≥ ∆vv where v is the value maximizing the expression on the right. In this case
we have − ≤ ∆vv − αj(v − v) ≤ 1 + . Putting this all together, we have
Pr
[
Γxt+1j 6= Γxtj
∣∣ αk, k 6= j]
≤ Pr
[
∃v ∈ V : − ≤ ∆vv − αj(v − v) ≤ 1 +  or − ≤ ∆vv − αj(v − v) ≤ 1 + 
∣∣∣ αk, k 6= j]
≤
∑
v∈V
(
Pr
[
αj ∈
[
∆vv−1−
v−v ,
∆vv+
v−v
] ∣∣∣∣ αk, k 6= j]+ Pr[αj ∈ [−∆vv−v−v , −∆vv+1+v−v ] ∣∣∣∣ αk, k 6= j])
≤ 2κρ.
The last line follows from the fact that v − v ≥ δ and v − v ≥ δ, the fact that D is (ρ, 1+2δ )-dispersed, and
a union bound.
Since this bound does not depend on the values of αk for k 6= j, we can remove the conditioning and
bound Pr[Γxt+1j 6= Γxtj ] ≤ 2κρ. Taking a union bound over all j ≤ N , we then have that, by admissibility,
Pr [xt+1 6= xt] = Pr
[
Γxt+1 6= Γxt
] ≤ 2Nκρ, which implies the result.
To bound the regret, it remains to bound the perturbation term in Equation (1). This bound is specific
to the distribution D. Many distribution families, including (discrete and continuous) uniform, Gaussian,
Laplacian, and exponential can lead to a sublinear regret when the variance is set appropriately. Here we
present a concrete regret analysis for the case of a uniform distribution:
Theorem 2.5. Let Γ be a (κ, δ)-admissible matrix with N columns and let D be the uniform distribution on
[0, 1/η] for η =
√
δ/((1 + 2)Tκ). Then, the regret of Generalized FTPL can be bounded as REGRET ≤
O(N
√
(1 + 2)Tκ/δ) + T. In general, κ ≤ 1/δ, so this bound is at most O((N/δ)√(1 + 2)T )+ T .
The proof of this theorem follows immediately from Lemmas 2.1 and 2.4, setting ρ = η(1 + 2)/δ =√
(1 + 2)/(Tκδ).
2.2 Oracle-Efficient Online Learning
We now define the offline oracle and oracle-efficient online learning framework more formally. Our oracles
are defined for real-weighted datasets, but can be easily implemented by integer-weighted oracles (see the
reduction in Appendix H.2). Since many natural offline oracles are iterative optimization algorithms, which
are only guaranteed to return an approximate solution in finite time, our definition assumes that the oracle
takes the desired precision  as an input. For ease of exposition, we assume that all numerical computations,
even those involving real numbers, take O(1) time. We address this point in more detail in Appendix H.
Definition 2.6 (Offline Oracle). An offline oracle OPT is any algorithm that receives as input a weighted set
of adversary actions S = {(w`, y`)}`∈L with w` ∈ R+, y` ∈ Y and a desired precision , and returns an
action xˆ = OPT(S, ) such that ∑
(w,y)∈S
wf(xˆ, y) ≥ max
x∈X
∑
(w,y)∈S
wf(x, y)− .
Definition 2.7 (Oracle Efficiency). We say that an online algorithm is oracle-efficient with per-round com-
plexity g(T ) if its per-round running time is O(g(T )) with oracle calls counting O(1).
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Algorithm 2: Oracle-Based Generalized FTPL
Input: datasets Sj , j ∈ [N ], that implement a matrix Γ ∈ [0, 1]|X |×N
distribution D with non-negative support.
an offline oracle OPT
Draw αj ∼ D for j = 1, . . . , N .
for t = 1, . . . , T do
For all j, let αjSj denote the scaled version of Sj , i.e., αjSj := {(αjw, y) : (w, y) ∈ Sj}.
Set S =
{
(1, y1), . . . , (1, yt−1)
} ∪⋃j≤N αjSj .
Play xt = OPT
(
S, 1√
T
)
.
Observe yt and receive payoff f(xt, yt).
end for
We next define a property of a translation matrix Γ which allows us to transform the perturbed objective
into a dataset, thus achieving oracle-efficiency of Generalized FTPL:
Definition 2.8. A matrix Γ is implementable with complexity M if for each j ∈ [N ] there exists a weighted
dataset Sj , with |Sj | ≤M , such that
for all x, x′ ∈ X : Γxj − Γx′j =
∑
(w,y)∈Sj
w
(
f(x, y)− f(x′, y)).
In this case, we say that weighted datasets Sj , j ∈ [N ], implement Γ with complexity maxj∈[N ] |Sj |.
One simple but useful example of implementability is when each column j of Γ specifies the payoffs
of every learner action under a particular adversary action yj ∈ Y , i.e., Γxj = f(x, yj) for all x. In this
case, Sj = {(1, yj)}. Using an implementable Γ gives rise to an oracle-efficient variant of the Generalized
FTPL, provided in Algorithm 2, in which we explicitly set  = 1/
√
T . Theorem 2.9, the proof of which is
in Appendix B, shows that the output of this algorithm is equivalent to the output of Generalized FTPL and
therefore the same regret guarantees hold. Note the assumption that the perturbations αj are non-negative.
The algorithm can be extended to negative perturbations when both Γ and −Γ are implementable. (See
Section 5 for details.)
Theorem 2.9. If Γ is implementable with complexity M , then Algorithm 2 is an oracle-efficient implemen-
tation of Algorithm 1 with  = 1/
√
T and has per-round complexity O
(
T +NM
)
.
As an immediate corollary, we obtain that the existence of a polynomial-time offline oracle implies the
existence of polynomial-time online learner with regret O(
√
T ), whenever we have access to an imple-
mentable and admissible matrix.
Corollary 2.10. Assume that Γ ∈ [0, 1]|X |×N is implementable with complexity M and (κ, δ)-admissible,
and there exists an approximate offline oracle OPT
(·, 1√
T
)
which runs in time poly(N,M, T ). Then Algo-
rithm 2 with distribution D as defined in Theorem 2.5 runs in time poly(N,M, T ) and achieves cumulative
regret O(N
√
Tκ/δ).
Alternative Notions of Oracles Multiple other notions of offline optimization oracles may be interest-
ing here. In particular, one can consider integer-weighted oracles or pseudo-polynomial oracles. We discuss
these alternative notions in Appendix H. First, we show that approximately optimal real-weighted oracles
can be implemented by integer-weighted oracles. This implies that all of our results immediately extend
to the case of integer-weighted oracles. For pseudo-polynomial oracles, the running time of the algorithm
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depends on the pseudo-complexity of the dataset that implements Γ (pseudo-complexity is defined in Ap-
pendix H.1). In that case, for instance, the actual size of the weights that are needed to implement matrix Γ
affect the final running time of the learning algorithm. To capture such oracles, we must slightly strengthen
our implementability definitions to account for the pseudo-complexity of the dataset that implements Γ.
We discuss these points further in Appendix H. Furthermore, as we show in Appendix H.4, the pseudo-
complexity of matrices Γ that we construct in the next section is polynomial in the parameters of interest.
3 Online Auction Design
In this section, we apply the general techniques developed in Section 2 to obtain oracle-efficient no-regret
algorithms for several common auction classes.
Consider a mechanism-design setting in which a seller wants to allocate k ≥ 1 heterogeneous resources
to a set of n bidders. The allocation to a bidder i is a subset of {1, . . . , k}, which we represent as a vector in
{0, 1}k, and the seller has some feasibility constraints on the allocations across bidders. Each bidder i ∈ [n]
has a combinatorial valuation function vi ∈ V , where V ⊆
({0, 1}k → [0, 1]). We use v ∈ Vn to denote the
vector of valuation functions across all bidders. A special case of the setting is that of multi-item auctions
for k heterogeneous items, where each resource is an item and the feasibility constraint simply states that no
item is allocated to more than one bidder. Another special case is that of single-parameter (service-based)
environments in which each resource is a service, e.g., receiving a bundle of items in combinatorial auctions
with single minded bidders. Formally, each bidders allocation is in {0, 1}, so we treat this as a setting with
k = 1 resources where the seller has some constraints on which bidders can receive a service simultaneously.
We describe this in more detail in Section 3.1.
An auction a takes as input a bid profile consisting of reported valuations for each bidder, and returns
both the allocation for each bidder i and the price that he is charged. In this work, we only consider truthful
auctions, where each bidder maximizes his utility by reporting his true valuation, irrespective of what other
bidders report. We therefore make the assumption that each bidder reports vi as their bid and refer to v not
only as the valuation profile, but also as the bid profile throughout the rest of this section. The allocation that
the bidder i receives is denoted qi(v) ∈ {0, 1}k and the price that he is charged is pi(v); we allow sets qi(v)
to overlap across bidders, and drop the argument v when it is clear from the context. We consider bidders
with quasilinear utilities: the utility of bidder i is vi(qi(v)) − pi(v). For an auction a with price function
p(·), we denote by Rev(a,v) the revenue of the auction for bid profile v, i.e., Rev(a,v) = ∑i∈[n] pi(v).
For single-parameter service-based environments (a special case of which are single-item auctions), we
slightly simplify notation and use vi ∈ [0, 1] to denote the value of bidder i for being served.
Fixing a class of (truthful) auctions A and a set of possible valuations V , we consider the problem in
which on each round t = 1, . . . , T , a learner chooses an auction at ∈ A while an adversary chooses a bid
profile vt ∈ Vn. The learner then observes vt and receives revenue Rev(at,vt). The goal of the learner is
to obtain low expected regret with respect to the best auction from A in hindsight. That is, we would like to
guarantee that
REGRET := E
[
max
a∈A
T∑
t=1
Rev(a,vt)−
T∑
t=1
Rev(at,vt)
]
≤ o(T )poly(n, k).
We require our online algorithm to be oracle-efficient, assuming access to an -approximate offline optimiza-
tion oracle that takes as input a weighted set of bid profiles, S = {(w`,v`)}`∈L and returns an auction that
achieves an approximately optimal revenue on S, i.e., a revenue at least maxa∈A
∑
(w,v)∈S wRev(a,v)− .
Throughout the section, we assume that there exists such an oracle for  = 1/
√
T , as needed in Algorithm 2.
Using the language of oracle-based online learning developed in Section 2, the learner’s action corre-
sponds to the choice of auction, the adversary’s action corresponds to the choice of bid profile, the payoff
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of the learner corresponds to the revenue generated by the auction, and we assume access to an offline
optimization oracle OPT. These correspondences are summarized in the following table.
Auction Setting Oracle-Based Learning Equivalent
Auctions at ∈ A Learner actions xt ∈ X
Bid/valuation profiles vt ∈ Vn Adversary actions yt ∈ Y
Revenue function Rev Payoff function f
For several of the auction classes we consider, such as multi-item or multi-unit auctions, the revenue of
an auction on a bid profile is in range [0, R] for R > 1. In order to use the results of Section 2, we implicitly
re-scale all the revenue functions by dividing them by R before applying Theorem 2.5. Note that, since Γ
does not change, the admissibility condition keeps the regret of the normalized problem at O(N
√
Tκ/δ),
according to Theorem 2.5. We then scale up to get a regret bound that isR times the regret for the normalized
problem, i.e., O(RN
√
Tκ/δ). This re-scaling does not increase the runtime, as when both the revenues are
scaled down by a factor of R and the matrix Γ is unchanged, the implementability dataset Sj is scaled up
by a factor of R which does not change the complexity M of implementing Γ since we assume all numeral
computations take O(1) time. Refer to Appendix H for a note on numerical computations and the mild
change in runtime when numerical computations do not take O(1) time.
We now derive results for VCG auctions with bidder-specific reserves, envy-free item-pricing auctions,
and level auctions. We defer the definition of each auction class to its respective subsection.
3.1 VCG with Bidder-Specific Reserves
In this section, we consider a standard class of auctions, VCG auctions with bidder-specific reserve prices,
which we define more formally below and denote by I. These auctions are known to approximately maxi-
mize the revenue when the bidder valuations are drawn independently (but not necessarily identically) from
some distribution [24]. Recently, Roughgarden and Wang [44] considered this class I in an online learning
framework. They provided a computationally efficient algorithm whose total revenue is at least 1/2 of the
best revenue among auctions in I, minus a term that is o(T ). We apply the techniques from Section 2 to
generate an oracle-efficient online algorithm with low additive regret with respect to the optimal auction in
the class I, without any loss in multiplicative factors.
We go beyond single-item auctions and consider general single-parameter environments. In these en-
vironments, each bidder has one piece of private valuation for receiving a service, i.e., being included in
the set of winning bidders. We allow for some combinations of bidders to be served simultaneously, and let
S ⊆ 2[n] be the family of feasible sets, i.e., sets of bidders that can be served simultaneously; with some
abuse of notation we write q ∈ S , to mean that the set represented by the binary allocation vector q is in
S. We assume that it is possible for any bidder to be the sole bidder served, i.e., that {i} ∈ S for all i, and
that it is possible that no bidder is served, i.e., ∅ ∈ S .6 Examples of such environments include single-item
single-unit auctions (for which S contains only singletons and the empty set), single-item s-unit auctions
(for which S contains any subset of size at most s), and combinatorial auctions with single-minded bidders.
In the last case, we begin with some set of original items, define the service as receiving the desired bundle
of items, and let S contain any subset of bidders seeking disjoint sets of items.
We consider the class of VCG auctions with bidder-specific reserves. In a basic VCG auction, an al-
location q∗ ∈ S is chosen to maximize social welfare, that is, maximize ∑ni=1 viq∗i . Each bidder who is
served is then charged the externality he imposes on others, pi(v) = maxq∈S
∑
i′ 6=i vi′qi′ −
∑
i′ 6=i vi′q
∗
i′ ,
which can be shown to equal the minimum bid at which he would be served. Such auctions are known to
be truthful. The most common example is the second-price auction for the single-item single-unit case in
6A more common and stronger assumption used in previous work [24, 44] is that S is a downward closed matroid.
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which the bidder with the highest bid receives the item and pays the second highest bid. VCG auctions with
reserves, which maintain the property of truthfulness, are defined as follows.
Definition 3.1 (VCG auctions with bidder-specific reserves). A VCG auction with bidder-specific reserves
is specified by a vector r of reserve prices for each bidder. As a first step, all bidders whose bids are below
their reserves (that is, bidders i for which vi < ri) are removed from the auction. If no bidders remain,
no item is allocated. Otherwise, the basic VCG auction is run on the remaining bidders to determine the
allocation. Each bidder who is served is charged the larger of his reserve and his VCG payment.
Fixing the set S of feasible allocations, we denote by I the class of all VCG auctions with bidder-specific
reserves. With a slight abuse of notation we write r ∈ I to denote the auction with reserve prices r. To apply
the results from Section 2, which require a finite action set for the learner, we limit attention to the finite
set of auctions Im ⊆ I consisting of those auctions in which the reserve price for each bidder is a strictly
positive integer multiple of 1/m, i.e., those where ri ∈ {1/m, . . . ,m/m} for all i. We will show for some
common choices of S that the best auction in this class yields almost as high revenue as the best auction
in I.
We next show how to design a matrix Γ for this problem that is admissible and implementable. As
a warmup, suppose we use the |Im| × n matrix Γ with Γri = Rev(r, ei) for all r ∈ Im and i ∈ [n].
That is, the ith column of Γ corresponds to the revenue of each auction on a bid profile in which bidder
i has valuation 1 and all others have valuation 0. By definition, Γ is implementable with complexity n
using Sj = {(1, ej)}j∈[n]. Moreover, Rev(r, ei) = ri so any two rows of Γ are indeed different and Γ is
(m, 1/m)-admissible. By Theorem 2.9, there is an oracle-efficient implementation of the Generalized FTPL
with regret that is polynomial in m.
To improve this regret bound and obtain a regret that is polynomial in log(m), we carefully construct
another translation matrix that is implementable using a more complex dataset of adversarial actions. As
we describe shortly, the translation matrix we design is quite intuitive. The row corresponding to an auction
r contains a binary representation of its reserve prices. In this case, proving admissibility of the matrix is
simple. The challenge is then showing that this simple translation matrix is implementable using a dataset
of adversarial actions.
Construction of Γ: Let ΓVCG be an |Im| × (ndlogme) binary matrix, where the ith collection of dlogme
columns contain the binary encodings of the auctions’ reserve prices for bidder i. More formally, for any
i ≤ n and a bit position β ≤ dlogme, let j = (i− 1)dlogme+ β and set ΓVCGrj to be the βth bit of mri.
Lemma 3.2. ΓVCG is (2, 1)-admissible and implementable with complexity m.
Binary encoding
Auction r r1 r2
(1/3, 1/3) 0 1 0 1
(1/3, 2/3) 0 1 1 0 ∆ = −1
(1/3, 3/3) 0 1 1 1
(2/3, 1/3) 1 0 0 1
(2/3, 2/3) 1 0 1 0 ∆ = 0
(2/3, 3/3) 1 0 1 1
(3/3, 1/3) 1 1 0 1 ∆′ = 1
(3/3, 2/3) 1 1 1 0 ∆′ = −1
(3/3, 3/3) 1 1 1 1
Figure 1: ΓVCG for n = 2 bid-
ders and m = 3
We defer the proof of this lemma to Appendix C.1. Here, we illustrate
the main ideas used in the proof through a simple example.
Example 3.3. Consider ΓVCG for n = 2 bidders and m = 3 discretiza-
tion levels, as demonstrated in Figure 1. As an example, we show how
one can go about implementing columns 1 and 4 of ΓVCG.
Consider the first column of ΓVCG. This corresponds to the most sig-
nificant bit of r1, so this value is independent of the value of r2. Hence,
to implement this column, we need to find a set of bid profiles where
the difference in revenue is as prescribed by ΓVCG. Consider bid pro-
files vh = (h/3, 0) for h ∈ {1, 2, 3}. This requirement is satisfied by
S1 = {(wh,vh)}h iff the weights satisfy the following two equations:
1
3
(w1 + w2 + w3)− 2
3
(w2 + w3) = −1,
14
23
(w2 + w3)− 3
3
(w3) = 0,
where the left-hand sides of the two equations are the differences in the revenues of two reserve prices
r1 =
1
3 and
2
3 , and r1 =
2
3 and
3
3 , respectively, and the right-hand sides are the differences between
the corresponding entries of ΓVCG (denoted by ∆ in Figure 1). Note that S1 = {(3,v1), (2,v2), (4,v3)}
satisfies this requirement and implements the first column. Similarly, for implementing the fourth column we
consider bid profiles v′h = (0, h/3) for h ∈ {1, 2, 3} and equations dictated by the values of ΓVCG and
values ∆′. One can verify that S4 = {(6,v′1), (0,v′2), (3,v′3)} implements this column.
More generally, the proof of Lemma 3.2 shows that ΓVCG is implementable by showing that any differ-
ences in values in one column that solely depend on a single bidder’s reserve price lead to a system of linear
equations that is satisfiable.
The next theorem follows immediately from Lemma 3.2, Theorem 2.5, and the fact that the maximum
revenue is at most R.
Theorem 3.4. Consider the online auction design problem for the class of VCG auctions with bidder-
specific reserves, Im. Let R = maxr,v Rev(r,v) and let D be the uniform distribution as described in
Theorem 2.5. Then, the Oracle-Based Generalized FTPL algorithm with D and datasets that implement
ΓVCG is oracle-efficient with per-round complexity poly(n,m, T ) and has regret
E
[
max
r∈Im
T∑
t=1
Rev(r,vt)−
T∑
t=1
Rev(rt,vt)
]
≤ O(n log(m)R
√
T ).
Note that R is bounded by the number of bidders that can be served simultaneously, which is at most n.
Now we return to the infinite class I of all VCG auctions with reserve prices ri ∈ [0, 1]. We show
Im is a finite “cover” for this class when the family of feasible sets S is the set of all subsets of size at
most s, corresponding to single-item single-unit auctions (when s = 1) or more general single-item s-unit
auctions. In particular, we prove in Appendix C.2, that the optimal revenue of Im compared with that of I
can decrease by at most 2s/m at each round. That is,
max
r∈I
T∑
t=1
Rev(r,vt)− max
r∈Im
T∑
t=1
Rev(r,vt) ≤ 2Ts
m
. (2)
Setting m =
√
T and using Theorem 3.4, we obtain the following result for the class of auctions I.
Theorem 3.5. Consider the online auction design problem for the class of VCG auctions with bidder-
specific reserves, I, in s-unit auctions. LetD be the uniform distribution as described in Theorem 2.5. Then,
the Oracle-Based Generalized FTPL algorithm withD and datasets that implement ΓVCG is oracle-efficient
with per-round complexity poly(n, T ) and has regret
E
[
max
r∈I
T∑
t=1
Rev(r,vt)−
T∑
t=1
Rev(rt,vt)
]
≤ O(ns log(T )
√
T ).
3.2 Envy-free Item Pricing
In this section, we consider envy-free item pricing [20] in an environment with k heterogeneous items with
a supply of s` ≥ 0 units for each item ` ≤ k.
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Definition 3.6 (Envy-free Item-Pricing Auction). An envy-free item-pricing auction for k heterogeneous
items, given supply s` for ` = 1, . . . , k, is defined by a vector of prices a, where a` is the price of item `. The
mechanism considers bidders i = 1, . . . , n in order and allocates to bidder i the bundle qi ∈ {0, 1}k that
maximizes vi(qi)−a ·qi, among all feasible bundles, i.e., bundles that can be composed from the remaining
supplies. Bidder i is then charged the price a · qi.
Examples of such environments include unit-demand bidders and single-minded bidders in settings such
as hypergraph pricing, where bidders seek hyper-edges in a hypergraph, and its variant the highway problem,
where bidders seek hyperedges between sets of contiguous vertices [3, 20]. We describe some of these
problems in more detail later on.
We represent by Pm the class of all such envy-free item pricing auctions where all the prices are strictly
positive multiples of 1/m, i.e., a` ∈ {1/m, . . . ,m/m} for all `. Next, we discuss the construction of an
implementable and admissible translation matrix Γ. Consider a bid profile where one bidder has value v for
bundle e` and all other bidders have value 0 for all bundles. The revenue of auction a on such a bid profile
is a`1(v≥a`). Note the similarity to the case of VCG auctions with bidder-specific reserve prices r, where
bid profiles with a single non-zero valuation vi and revenue ri1(vi≥ri) were used to create an implementable
construction for Γ. We show that a similar construction works for Pm.
Construction of Γ: Let ΓIP be a |Pm| × (kdlogme) binary matrix, where the `th collection of dlogme
columns correspond to the binary encoding of the auction’s price for item `. More formally, for any ` ≤ k
and β ≤ dlogme, ΓIPaj is the βth bit of (the integer) ma`, where j = (`− 1)dlogme+β. Next, we show that
ΓIP is admissible and implementable. The proof of the following lemma is analogous to that of Lemma 3.2
and appears in Appendix C.3 for completeness.
Lemma 3.7. ΓIP is (2, 1)-admissible and implementable with complexity m.
Our main theorem follows immediately from Lemma 3.7, Theorems 2.5 and 2.9, and the fact that the
revenue of the mechanism at every step is at most R. In general, R is at most n.
Theorem 3.8. Consider the online auction design problem for the class of envy-free item pricing auctions,
Pm. Let R = maxa,v Rev(a,v) and let D be the uniform distribution as described in Theorem 2.5. Then,
the Oracle-Based Generalized FTPL algorithm with D and datasets that implement ΓIP is oracle-efficient
with per-round complexity poly(k,m, T ) and has regret
E
[
max
a∈Pm
T∑
t=1
Rev(a,vt)−
T∑
t=1
Rev(at,vt)
]
≤ O
(
kR log(m)
√
T
)
.
Consider the class of all envy-free item-pricing auctions where a` ∈ [0, 1] is a real number and denote
this class by P . We show that Pm is a discrete “cover” for P when there is an unlimited supply of all
items (s` = ∞ for all `) and the bidders have single-minded or unit-demand valuations. In the single-
minded setting, each bidder i is interested in one particular bundle of items qˆi. That is, vi(qi) = vi(qˆi)
for all qi ⊇ qˆi and 0 otherwise. In the unit-demand setting, each bidder i has valuation vi(e`) for item `,
and wishes to purchase at most one item, i.e., item arg max` (vi(e`)− a`). We show that in both settings,
discretizing item prices cannot decrease revenue by much (see Appendix C.4).
Lemma 3.9. For any a ∈ P there is a′ ∈ Pm, such that for any unit-demand valuation profile or for any
single-minded valuation profile v with infinite supply (the digital goods setting), Rev(a,v)−Rev(a′,v) ≤
2nk/m.
These discretization arguments together with Theorem 3.8 yield the following result for the class of
auctions P (using the fact that R ≤ n, and the setting m = √T ):
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Theorem 3.10. Consider the online auction design problem for the class of envy-free item pricing auctions,
P , with unit-demand bidders or with single-minded bidders with infinite supply (the digital goods setting).
Let D be the uniform distribution as described in Theorem 2.5. Then, the Oracle-Based Generalized FTPL
algorithm with D and datasets that implement ΓIP is oracle-efficient with per-round complexity poly(k, T )
and has regret
E
[
max
a∈P
T∑
t=1
Rev(a,vt)−
T∑
t=1
Rev(at,vt)
]
≤ O
(
nk log(T )
√
T
)
.
3.3 Level Auctions
We next consider the class of level auctions introduced by Morgenstern and Roughgarden [37]. These auc-
tions can achieve (1−)-approximate revenue maximization if the valuations of the bidders are drawn in-
dependently (but not necessarily identically) from a distribution [37], approximating Myerson’s optimal
auction [38]. Using our tools, we derive oracle-efficient no-regret algorithms for this auction class.
The s-level auctions realize a single-item single-unit allocation as follows.
Definition 3.11. An s-level auction θ is defined by s thresholds for each bidder i, 0 ≤ θi0 < · · · < θis−1 ≤ 1.
For any bid profile v, we let bθi (vi) denote the index b of the largest threshold θ
i
b ≤ vi, or −1 if vi < θi0.
If vi < θi0 for all i, the item is not allocated. Otherwise, the item goes to the bidder with the largest index
bθi (vi), breaking ties in favor of bidders with smaller i. The winner pays the price equal to the minimum bid
that he could have submitted and still won the item.
When it is clear from the context, we omit θ in bθi (vi) and write just bi(vi). We consider a class of s-level
auctions, Ss,m that is the set of all auctions described by Definition 3.11 with thresholds that are in the set
{0, 1m , . . . , mm}.
Let us discuss a construction of an admissible and implementable Γ for Ss,m. Our approach for designing
matrix Γ starts with a matrix that is clearly implementable, but the challenge is in showing that it is also
admissible. In what follows, we identify a small subset of the actions of the adversary, such that any two
actions of the learner receive sufficiently different revenues on at least one of these actions. This naturally
leads to an admissible and implementable construction for Γ.
Consider the bid profile in which the only non-zero bids are vn = `/m for some 0 ≤ ` ≤ m, and vi = 1
for a single bidder i < n. Note that bidder i wins the item in any such profile and pays θib corresponding
to b = max{0, bn(vn)}. We define a matrix Γ with one column for every bid profile of this form and
an additional column for the bid profile en, with the entries in each row consisting of the revenue of the
corresponding auction on the given bid profile. Clearly, Γ is implementable. As for admissibility, take θ ∈
Ss,m and the corresponding row Γθ. Note that as vn = `/m increases for ` = 0, . . . ,m, there is an increase
in bn(`/m) = −1, 0, . . . , s− 1, possibly skipping the initial −1. As the level bn(vn) increases, the auction
revenue attains the values θi0, θ
i
1, . . . , θ
i
s−1, changing exactly at those points where vn crosses thresholds
θn1 , . . . , θ
n
s−1. Since any two consecutive thresholds of θ are different, the thresholds of θib for b ≥ 0 and θnb
for b ≥ 1 can be reconstructed by analyzing the revenue of the auction and the values of vn at which the
revenue changes. The remaining threshold θn0 can be recovered by examining the revenue of the bid profile
v = en. Since all of the parameters of the auction can be recovered from the entries in the row, this shows
that any two rows of Γ are different and Γ is (m + 1, 1/m)-admissible. This reasoning is summarized in
the following construction and the corresponding lemma, the proofs of which appear in Appendix C.5. See
Figure 2 for more intuition.
Construction of Γ: For i ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1} and ` ∈ {0, . . . ,m}, let vi,` = ei + (`/m)en. Let V =
{vi,`}i,`∪{en}. Let ΓSL be the matrix of size |Ss,m|× |V | with entries indexed by (θ,v) ∈ Ss,m×V , such
that ΓSLθ,v = Rev(θ,v).
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Figure 2: Demonstration of how θ can be reconstructed by its revenue on the bid profiles in V = {vi,`}i,` ∪
{en}. On the left, we show that as the value vn (blue circle) gradually increases from 0 to 1, the revenue
of the auction (red vertical lines) jumps along the sequence of values θi0, θ
i
1, . . . , θ
i
s−1. So by analyzing the
revenue of an auction on all bid profiles {vi,`}i,` one can reconstruct θi for i 6= n and θn1 , . . . , θns−1. To
reconstruct θn0 , one only needs to consider the profile en. The figure on the right demonstrates the revenue
of the same auction, where the horizontal axis is the value of vn and the vertical axis is the revenue of the
auction when vi = 1 and all other valuations are 0.
Lemma 3.12. ΓSL is (m+ 1, 1/m)-admissible and implementable with complexity 1.
Our next theorem is an immediate consequence of Lemma 3.12, Theorems 2.5 and 2.9, and the fact that
the revenue of the mechanism at every step is at most 1.
Theorem 3.13. Consider the online auction design problem for the class of s-level auctions with no repeated
thresholds, Ss,m. Let D be the uniform distribution as described in Theorem 2.5. Then, the Oracle-Based
Generalized FTPL algorithm with D and datasets that implement ΓSL is oracle-efficient with per-round
complexity poly(n,m, T ) and has regret
E
[
max
θ∈Ss,m
T∑
t=1
Rev(θ,vt)−
T∑
t=1
Rev(θt,vt)
]
≤ O(nm2
√
T ).
4 Stochastic Adversaries and Stronger Benchmarks
So far our results apply to general adversaries, where the sequence of adversary actions are arbitrary and
where we showed that the payoff of the learner is close to the payoff of the best action in hindsight. Can
we make stronger statements about the average payoff of a no-regret learning algorithm when we impose
distributional assumptions on the sequence of the adversary?
We start with the easier setting where the actions of the adversary are drawn i.i.d. across all rounds and
then we analyze the slightly more complex setting where the actions of the adversary follow a fast-mixing
Markov chain. For both settings we show that the average payoff of the learning algorithm is close to the
optimal expected payoff, in expectation over the i.i.d. distribution across all rounds in the i.i.d. setting and
over the stationary distribution in the Markovian setting.
When applied to the online optimal auction setting, combining these results with approximate optimality
results of simple auctions such as s-level auctions or VCG with bidder-specific reserves, we get that the
average revenue of our online learning algorithms competes with the revenue achieved by the unrestricted
optimal auction for these distributional settings and not only with the best auction within the class over
which our algorithms were learning.
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4.1 Stochastic Adversaries
I.I.D. Adversary One extreme case is to assume that the adversary’s action yt at each iteration is drawn
independently and identically from the same unknown distribution F . This leads to the i.i.d. learning setting.
An easy application of the Chernoff-Hoeffding bound yields that for such a learning setting, the average pay-
off of a no-regret learner converges to the best payoff one could achieve in expectation over the distribution
F (see Appendix D.1 for the proof):
Lemma 4.1. Suppose that y1, . . . , yT are i.i.d. draws from a distribution F . Then for any no-regret learning
algorithm, with probability at least 1− δ,
1
T
T∑
t=1
Ext [f(xt, yt)] ≥ sup
x∈X
Ey∼F [f(x, y)]−
√
log(2/δ)
2T
− REGRET
T
. (3)
Markovian Adversary Suppose that the choice of the adversary yt follows a stationary and reversible
Markov process based on some transition matrix P (y, y′) with a stationary distribution F . Moreover, con-
sider the case where the set Y is finite. For any Markov chain, the spectral gap γ is defined as the dif-
ference between the first and the second largest eigenvalue of the transition matrix P (the first eigenvalue
always being 1). We will assume that this gap is bounded away from zero. The spectral gap of a Markov
chain is strongly related to its mixing time. In this work we will specifically use the following result of
Paulin [40], which is a Bernstein concentration inequality for sums of dependent random variables that are
the outcome of a stationary Markov chain with spectral gap bounded away from zero. A Markov chain
y1, . . . , yT is stationary if y1 ∼ F where F is the stationary distribution, and is reversible if for any y, y′,
F (y)P (y, y′) = F (y′)P (y′, y). For simplicity, we focus on stationary chains, though similar results hold
for non-stationary chains (see Paulin [40] and references therein).
Theorem 4.2 (Paulin [40], Theorem 3.8). Let X1, . . . , Xz be a stationary and reversible Markov chain on
a state space Ω, with stationary distribution F and spectral gap γ. Let g : Ω→ [0, 1], then
Pr
[∣∣∣∣∣1z
z∑
i=1
g(Xi)− EX∼F [g(X)]
∣∣∣∣∣ > 
]
≤ 2 exp
(
− zγ
2
4 + 10
)
.
Applying this result, we obtain the following lemma (see Appendix D.2 for the proof):
Lemma 4.3. Suppose that the adversary’s actions y1, . . . , yT form a stationary and reversible Markov
chain with stationary distribution F and spectral gap γ. Then for any no-regret learning algorithm, with
probability at least 1− δ:
1
T
T∑
t=1
Ext [f(xt, yt)] ≥ sup
x∈X
Ey∼F [f(x, y)]−
√
14 log(2/δ)
γT
− REGRET
T
. (4)
Example 4.4 (Sticky Markov Chain). Consider a Markov chain where at every iteration yt is equal to yt−1
with some probability ρ ≥ 1/2 and with the remaining probability (1 − ρ) it is drawn independently from
some fixed distribution F . It is clear that the stationary distribution of this chain is equal to F . We can bound
the spectral gap of this Markov chain by the Cheeger bound [10]. The Cheeger constant for a finite state,
reversible Markov chain is defined and in this case bounded as
Φ = min
Q⊆Ω:F (Q)≤1/2
∑
y∈Q
∑
y′∈Qc F (y)P (y, y
′)
F (Q)
= min
Q⊆Ω:F (Q)≤1/2
∑
y∈Q
∑
y′∈Qc F (y)(1− ρ)F (y′)
F (Q)
= min
Q⊆Ω:F (Q)≤1/2
(1− ρ)F (Q) · F (Q
c)
F (Q)
= min
Q⊆Ω:F (Q)≤1/2
(1− ρ)F (Qc) ≥ 1− ρ
2
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Moreover, by the Cheeger bound we know that γ ≥ Φ22 ≥ (1−ρ)
2
8 . Thus we get that for such a sequence of
adversary actions, with probability 1− δ,
1
T
T∑
t=1
Ext [f(xt, yt)] ≥ sup
x∈X
Ey∼F [f(x, y)]− 4
1− ρ
√
7 log(2/δ)
T
− REGRET
T
(5)
4.2 Implications for Online Optimal Auction Design
Consider the online optimal auction design problem for a single item and n bidders. Suppose that the ad-
versary who picks the valuation vectors v1, . . . ,vT , is Markovian and that the stationary distribution F
of the chain is independent across players, i.e., the stationary distribution is a product distribution F =
F1 × . . .× Fn.
Then we know that the optimal auction for this setting is what is known as Myerson’s auction [38],
which translates the players’ values based on some monotone function φ, known as the ironed virtual value
function and then allocates the item to the bidder with the highest virtual value, charging payments so that
the mechanism is dominant-strategy truthful.
A recent result of Morgenstern and Roughgarden [37] shows that level auctions approximate Myerson’s
auction in terms of revenue. In particular, if distributions Fi are bounded in [1, H], then the class of s-level
auctions with s = Ω(1 + log1+H), where the thresholds can be any real numbers, achieves expected
revenue at least (1− ) of the expected optimal revenue of Myerson’s auction. Analogously to these results,
we prove and use an additive approximation result using thresholds that are in the discretized set Ss,m
(defined in Section 3.3), rather than the multiplicative guarantees of Morgenstern and Roughgarden [37]
that can use any real numbers as thresholds. We use a discretization level m = Θ
(
1
2
)
and number of levels
s = Θ
(
1

)
, to prove that
max
θ∈Ss,m
Ev∼F [Rev(θ,v)] ≥ OPT(F )− , (6)
where OPT(F ) is the optimal revenue achievable by any dominant-strategy truthful mechanism for valuation
vector distribution F . At a high level, we first show that one can discretize the support of F to O(1/) levels
while losing only O() in revenue. We then show that a variant of the class of auctions Ss,1/, called Rs,1/
that allows two consecutive thresholds to be equal, approximates the optimal revenue on the discretized
valuations. Finally, by using a finer grid, we show that the optimal auction in Ss,m approximates the optimal
auction in Rs,1/, which in turn, approximates the optimal revenue on discretized valuations. The proof of
this equation appears in Appendix D. Combining the results in this section with the aforementioned results
we get the following theorem:
Theorem 4.5 (Competing with Overall Optimal). Consider the online auction design problem for a single
item among n bidders, where the sequence of valuation vectors v1, . . . ,vT is Markovian, following a sta-
tionary and reversible Markov process, with a stationary distribution F = F1 × . . . × Fn that is a product
distribution across bidders, Fis are continuous, and with a spectral gap of γ > 0. Then the oracle-efficient
online learning algorithm (studied in Theorem 3.13) which optimizes over the set of s-level auctions Ss,m
with s = Θ(n−1/5T 1/10) and with a discretization of the threshold levels of size m = Θ(n−2/5T 1/5),
guarantees the following bound with probability at least 1− δ:
1
T
T∑
t=1
Eθt [Rev(θt,vt)] ≥ OPT(F )−O
(
1√
m
)
−
√
14 log(2/δ)
γT
−O
(
nm2√
T
)
≥ OPT(F )−O
(
n1/5
T 1/10
)
.
Example 4.6 (Valuation Shocks). Consider the setting where valuations of players in the beginning of time
are drawn from some product distribution F = F1× . . .×Fn. Then at every iteration with some probability
ρ the valuations of all players remain the same as in the previous iteration, while with some probability
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1− ρ, there is a shock in the market and the valuations of the players are re-drawn from distribution F . As
we analyzed in the previous section, the spectral gap of the Markov chain defined by this setting is at least
(1−ρ)2
8 . Thus we get a regret bound which depends inversely proportionally with the quantity 1− ρ.
Hence, our online learning algorithm achieves revenue that is close to the optimal revenue achievable
by any dominant-strategy truthful mechanism for the distribution F . More importantly, it achieves this guar-
antee even if the valuations of the players are not drawn i.i.d. at every iteration and even if the learner does
not know what the distribution F is, when the valuations of the players are going to be re-drawn, or what
the rate ρ of shocks in the markets is.
5 Contextual Online Learning (Side Information)
We now consider a generalization of the online learning setting of Section 2, where at every iteration the
learner also observes contextual information. The context σt at each iteration comes from some abstract con-
text space Σ. In this setting the learner wants to use such contextual information to improve his performance.
Specifically, the goal of the learner is to compete with a set of policies Π, where a policy is a mapping from
a context σt ∈ Σ to an action pi(σt) ∈ X . We will denote with Π the set of policies over which the learner
is optimizing.
The action space of the adversary is a context σ ∈ Σ and an action y ∈ Y . Then the payoff of the learner
if he chooses a policy pi and the adversary chooses a context σ and an action y ∈ Y is given by: f(pit(σ), yt).
The regret of any algorithm is given by:
REGRET = E
[
max
pi∈Π
T∑
t=1
f(pi(σt), yt)−
T∑
t=1
f(pit(σt), yt)
]
.
The offline oracle assumption now asks for an algorithm that takes as input a distribution over contexts and
adversary actions and returns the best policy in the policy space for this distribution.
Example 5.1 (Contextual online auction design). In the setting of online auction design, contextual on-
line learning corresponds to the generalization where prior to the auction and the bidding process the
designer observes contextual information about the bidders. The goal of the learner is now to compete
over a set of policies that map contextual information to an auction. Given a class of auctions A, a
set of possible valuations V , a policy class Π and an unknown sequence of bid profiles and contexts
(σ1,v1), . . . , (σT ,vT ) ∈ Σ × Vn, the goal is to provide an online algorithm that picks a policy pit ∈ Π at
every time step and achieves a revenue that is close to the revenue of the best policy pi ∈ Π in hindsight:
REGRET = E
[
max
pi∈Π
T∑
t=1
Rev(pi(σt),vt)−
T∑
t=1
Rev(pit(σt),vt)
]
≤ o(T ).
The contextual learning setting is another instance of the general learning setting, with learner action
space Xc = Π ⊆ (Σ → X ), adversary action space Yc = Σ × Y and payoff function fc(pi, (σ, y)) =
f(pi(σ), y) as defined above. Moreover, a contextual offline oracle is an offline oracle for this new learning
setting.
5.1 Non-Contextual to Contextual Learning for Separable Policies
If we are given an admissible and implementable matrix Γ in the original learning setting, then we show
how to construct an admissible and implementable matrix ΓQ for the contextual learning setting. For this
reduction we will use the notion of a separator of the policy space, defined in [45].
Definition 5.2 (Separator). A set Q ⊆ Σ of contexts is a separator for a policy space Π, if for any two
policies pi, pi′ ∈ Π, there exists a context σ ∈ Q such that pi(σ) 6= pi′(σ).
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Definition 5.3 (Contextual Q-extension of a matrix Γ). For any matrix Γ ∈ [0, 1]|X |×N , we define its
contextual Q-extension ΓQ as an |Π| × (|Q| · N) matrix, where each column jc is associated with a pair
(σ, j) for σ ∈ Q and j ∈ [N ] and such that the value of ΓQ at coordinates (pi, (σ, j)) is equal to the entry
of matrix Γ at coordinates (pi(σ), j), i.e.,
ΓQpi,(σ,j) = Γpi(σ),j . (7)
The next two lemmas, whose proofs appears in Appendices E.1 and E.2, shows that if a matrix is admis-
sible and implementable, then its extension with respect to a separator is also admissible and implementable
in the contextual setting.
Lemma 5.4 (Contextual Admissibility). If Γ is a (κ, δ)-admissible matrix for a learning setting and Q
is a separator for the policy Π, then the contextual Q-extension ΓQ is a (κ, δ)-admissible matrix for the
contextual learning setting.
Lemma 5.5 (Contextual Implementability). If matrix Γ is implementable with complexity M in the original
learning setting, then matrix ΓQ is implementable with complexity M in the contextual learning setting.
Given the above two lemmas we can now invoke Theorem 2.5 applied to the contextual setting and get
the result:
Corollary 5.6. Assume that Γ ∈ [0, 1]|X |×N is implementable with complexity M and (κ, δ)-admissible.
Let Q be a separator of the policy space Π of size d. let D be the uniform distribution on [0, 1/η] for
η =
√
δ/(2Tκ). Then Algorithm 2 applied to the contextual learning setting with the contextualQ-extension
ΓQ of matrix Γ achieves regret:
REGRET ≤ O(Nd
√
Tκ/δ).
Moreover, if there exists a contextual offline oracle OPT(·, 1√
T
) which runs in time poly(N,M, T ), then
Algorithm 2 can be implemented efficiently in time poly(N, d,M, T ).
In the context of online binary classification where the features are vectors of boolean variables, [45]
presents a set of examples of policy spaces that are separable. To portray the applicability of our contextual
theorem, we present an example of a policy space for an auction problem that is also separable.
Example 5.7 (ORs of Boolean Features). Consider the case where each feature vector σ is a boolean
vector in {0, 1}r. Moreover, consider the case of online auction design over the class of single-item second
price auctions with bidder specific reserves. An example of a policy space that is separable is a policy that
resembles an A/B testing over reserve prices. The auctioneer splits his reserve prices into two disjoint sets
A and B (for instance, A could be a set of vectors of low reserve prices, below some threshold, and B
is a set of vectors of high reserves prices). Then the set of policies is defined as follows: for each context
σ = (σ1, . . . , σr) take the OR of a subset of the boolean coordinates. If the OR evaluates to 1, then pick
some vector of bidder specific reserve prices from set A and if the OR is 0 then pick any vector of reserve
prices from set B. The whole set of policies is then generated by picking which subset of the coordinates to
use for the OR function and which vector of reserves from A to output on 1 and which vector of reserves
from B to output on 0. By running our contextual online learning algorithm over such a policy space, the
auctioneer can learn which of the boolean coordinates are indicative of a high valuation for the players and
when any one of them is 1 it will place a high reserve price, optimizing also over the exact vector of reserves
within a high regime. Otherwise it will find an optimal vector of reserves from a low regime.
Observe that the set of r boolean vectors that are 1 on only one coordinate, plus the all-zero boolean
vector, is a separator for this policy space. Consider any two set of different policies pi, pi′. If they use the
same OR function, then they must differ in which vector of reserves they use from A or B. Thus they must
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be outputting a different action at some of the boolean vectors of the separator. If they differ in the OR
function, then suppose that one includes coordinate j and the other doesn’t. Then on the boolean vector
which is 1 on only coordinate j, the one policy evaluates to 1 and picks a reserve vector from set A, while
the other evaluates to 0 and picks a reserve vector from set B which has to be different, since A and B are
disjoint. Thus the size of the separator for this class of policies is O(r), while the size of the policy space is
exponential in r.
Similar analysis can be done when the policy is using the AND of boolean features rather than the OR.
5.2 Transductive Contextual Setting
We now consider the case where the learner knows a priori the set of contexts that could potentially arise,
i.e., we assume that he knows that all contexts σ1, . . . , σT come from a set P , which we will refer to as the
transductive set. We do not require that the learner knows the multiplicity of each context or the sequence
under which contexts arrive. Moreover, the set P could be of size as large as T .
In this setting, ignoring some technical details, we could treat the transductive set P as a separator set
from the last section. However, by doing so, the regret guarantee that we would derive from the analysis
of the previous section grows super-linearly in T , when the size of the set P is of Θ(T ). Thus in order to
guarantee sub-linear regret in the transductive setting we need a tighter analysis. To achieve this we will
leverage the fact that in the transductive setting P is the whole set of contexts that will arise, which is a
stronger property than being a separator. This will allow us to prove a stronger stability lemma than the
one that would arise from invoking Lemma 2.4 for the contextual learning setting. Moreover, we will use
a perturbation distribution D that has mean zero, leading to cancellations in the cumulative error term, that
make that term not grow linearly with the size of P but rather as the square root of the size of P . The
combination of these two improvements leads to sub-linear regret even when |P | = Θ(T ).
We consider a learning setting that admits a translation matrix Γ ∈ [0, 1]|X |×N that is implementable
with complexityM and (κ, δ)-admissible. For the transductive contextual version of the learning setting, we
will analyze Algorithm 2, with the contextual extension ΓP of matrix Γ (where P is the transductive set).
We first show an improved stability property of this algorithm. Even though the number of columns of
matrix ΓP is |P | · N we can show that the stability of the algorithm does not depend on |P |. The proof of
the next Lemma appears in Appendix E.3.
Lemma 5.8. Consider the Generalized FTPL algorithm in the transductive contextual learning setting with
translation matrix the contextual extension ΓP of a (κ, δ)-admissible matrix Γ ∈ [0, 1]|X |×N and with a(
ρ, 1+2δ
)
-dispersed distribution D. Then,
E
[
T∑
t=1
fc(pit+1, (σt, yt))− fc(pit, (σt, yt))
]
≤ 2TNκρ.
Moreover, we need to show that the error term:
E
[
α · (ΓPx1 − ΓPx∗)
]
(8)
in Equation (1) also does not grow linearly with the size of the transductive set |P |, since |P | could be of
order O(T ). To achieve this we will use a mean-zero distribution D, rather than a positive supported one.
For such mean zero distributions we can show that the error term grows as the square root of the number
of columns of the contextual matrix, rather than linearly. Combining the two improvements we get the
following theorem (see Appendix E for the proof), which is a more refined version of Theorem 2.5.
Theorem 5.9. Let Γ ∈ [0, 1]|X |×N be a (κ, δ)-admissible matrix and D be the uniform distribution on
[−ν, ν]. Then the regret of the Generalized FTPL algorithm in the transductive contextual learning setting
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Algorithm 3: Oracle-Based Generalized FTPL with positively and negatively supported distributions
Input: datasets Sj and S−j , j ∈ N that implement and negatively implement Γ ∈ [0, 1]|X |×N
distribution D with support on the real line.
an offline oracle OPT
Draw αj ∼ D for j = 1, . . . , N .
for t = 1, . . . , T do
For all j = 1, . . . , N :
If αj < 0, let Qj := {(|αj |w, y) : (w, y) ∈ S−j } be the scaled version of S−j .
If αj ≥ 0, let Qj := {(αjw, y) : (w, y) ∈ Sj}, be the scaled version of Sj .
Set S =
{
(1, y1), . . . , (1, yt−1)
} ∪⋃j≤N Qj .
Play xt = OPT(S, 1√T ).
Observe yt and receive payoff f(xt, yt).
end for
with translation matrix ΓP can be bounded as
REGRET ≤ TNκ(1 + 2)
νδ
+ 2ν
√
2N |P | ln |X |+ T.
For ν =
√
Tκ(1+2)N
1
4
√
δ(|P | ln |X |) 14
the above bound becomes O
(
N
3
4 (|P | ln |X |) 14
√
Tκ(1+2)
δ + T
)
. Since |P | ≤ T ,
the latter is O
(
(NT )
3
4 (ln |X |) 14
√
κ(1+2)
δ + T
)
.
Finally, it remains to argue the oracle efficiency of the Generalized FTPL algorithm. However, we ob-
serve that the implementability condition we imposed in Section 2, only allowed for positive supported
distributions D. If we want to allow for distributions D supported on the real line, then we need our trans-
lation matrix to be implementable with a dataset, even if the distribution takes negative values. For that, we
need to be able to simulate the negative of the difference between any two entries of a column, with a dataset
of adversarial actions. This leads to the following extra condition on the translation matrix.
Definition 5.10. A matrix Γ is negatively implementable with complexityM if there exists weighted datasets
S−j for all j ∈ [N ] with |S−j | ≤M , such that
for all x, x′ ∈ X : − (Γxj − Γx′j) = ∑
(w,y)∈Sj
w
(
f(x, y)− f(x′, y)).
Alternatively, we say that weighted datasets {S−j }j∈[N ] negatively implement Γ with complexity maxj∈[N ] |S−j |.
Using a Γ that is both implementable and negatively implementable, gives rise to an oracle-efficient vari-
ant of the Generalized FTPL, provided in Algorithm 3, which also allows for distributions D with negative
support. Similar to Theorem 2.9, it is easy to see that the output of this algorithm is equivalent to the output
of Generalized FTPL, and therefore the same regret guarantees hold (we omit this proof as it is identical to
the proof of Theorem 2.9).
Theorem 5.11. If Γ is implementable and negatively implementable with complexity M , then Algorithm 3
is an oracle-efficient implementation of Algorithm 1 with  = 1√
T
with per-round complexity O
(
T +NM
)
.
As an immediate corollary, we obtain that the existence of a polynomial-time offline contextual oracle
implies the existence of polynomial-time contextual online learner with regret O(T 3/4), whenever we have
access to an implementable, negatively implementable, and admissible matrix.
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Corollary 5.12. Assume that Γ ∈ [0, 1]|X |×N is implementable and negatively implementable with com-
plexity M and (κ, δ)-admissible, and there exists an offline contextual oracle OPT(·, 1√
T
) which runs in
time poly(N,M, T ). Then Algorithm 3 applied to the transductive contextual learning setting with datasets
that implement the translation matrix ΓP , runs in time poly(T,N,M) and achieves cumulative regret
O
(
(NT )
3
4 (ln |X |) 14√κδ).
Observe that the proofs of implementability that we gave in Lemmas 3.2 and 3.7 for VCG auctions with
bidder-specific reserves and on envy-free item pricing, correspondingly, actually show the stronger condition
that these matrices are also negatively implementable. The reason is that they prove that we can simulate
any difference of perturbations between two reserve prices of a bidder (where it is a negative or positive
difference). Thus the results for those applications immediately extend to the transductive contextual setting
by invoking the theorem above.
6 Approximate Oracles and Approximate Regret
As we saw, the Oracle-Based Generalized FTPL algorithm requires an oracle to choose an action with a total
payoff that is within a small additive error of that of the optimal action. In this section, we extend our main
results regarding the Oracle-Based Generalized FTPL algorithm to work with oracles that return an action
whose payoff is only a constant approximation of that of the optimal actions. An offline approximation
oracle is defined formally as follows:
Definition 6.1 (Offline Approximation Oracle). An offline approximation oracle for a set of learner’s actions
X and function f , C-OPT(f,X ) where C ≤ 1, is any algorithm that receives as input a weighted set of
adversary actions S = {(w`, y`)}`∈L, wk ∈ R+, yk ∈ Y , and returns x ∈ X , such that∑
(w,y)∈S
wf(x, y) ≥ C max
x∈X
∑
(w,y)∈S
wf(x, y).
Similarly below we will use notation OPT(f,X ) to represent an offline oracle OPT defined in Section 2.2
for function f and set X , making the dependence explicit.
As discussed earlier, access to an oracle OPT that has a small additive approximation error is needed
for achieving no-regret results. That is, using standard online-to-batch reductions [7, 13], one can turn a
polynomial time online no-regret algorithm into a polynomial time additive approximation scheme for the
offline problem. So, when the best approximation for a problem is obtained through a C-approximation
oracle for general C, there is no hope for achieving no-regret results. Instead Kakade et al. [31] introduced
an alternative measure of regret, called C-REGRET, for competing with an offline approximation algorithm.
Formally, the C-REGRET of an online maximization problem is defined as
C-REGRET = E
[
C max
a∈A
T∑
t=1
f(x, yt)−
T∑
t=1
f(xt, yt)
]
.
Note that for FPTAS algorithm, whereC = 1− for any desirable , using  = 1/poly(T ) recovers a no-
regret guarantee. Below we consider several types of constant approximation oracles, such as approximation
through relaxation of the objective and approximation oracles that stem from Maximal-in-Range (MIR)
algorithms, and show that using the Oracle-Based Generalized FTPL algorithm with the approximation
oracles obtains vanishing C-REGRET.
6.1 Approximation through Relaxation
A large class of approximation algorithms achieve their approximation guarantees by exactly optimizing
a relaxation of the objective functions. More formally, if there is a function F : X × Y → R, such that
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Cf(x, y) ≤ F (x, y) ≤ f(x, y) and there is an offline oracle OPT(F,X ) (with  = 0 for simplicity), then it is
clear that any online algorithm for F is also online algorithm with vanishing C-REGRET for f . This result
is more formally stated below.
Theorem 6.2. Let F be a functions such that for any x ∈ X and y ∈ Y , f(x, y) ≥ F (x, y) ≥ Cf(x, y).
Let ΓF ∈ [0, 1]|X |×N be (κ, δ)-admissible and implementable for function F with complexity g(N,T ). Let
D be the uniform distribution on [0, 1/η] for η =
√
δ/(2Tκ). Then, the Oracle-Based Generalized FTPL
algorithm with D, datasets that implement ΓF , and OPT(F,X ) is oracle-efficient with per-round complexity
O(T + g(N,T )) and regret
C-REGRET ≤ 2N
√
2Tκ/δ.
A similar observation was made by Balcan and Blum [3] regarding approximation algorithms that use
linear optimization as a relaxation and therefore can be efficiently optimized by the standard FTPL algorithm
of Kalai and Vempala [32]. Our work extends this observation to any relaxation of function f that has an
FPTAS and an admissible and implementable translation matrix.
Roughgarden and Wang [44] as a Relaxation. The approach of Roughgarden and Wang [44] for achiev-
ing a 1/2-regret for single-item second price auctions with bidder-specific reserves, falls exactly in the
relaxation approximation framework. They give a relaxed objective which admits a polynomial time offline
oracle and which is always within a factor 2 from the original objective. Then they run an oracle based
online learning algorithm for the relaxed objective. However, in their case the relaxed objective corresponds
to an online linear optimization problem and can be solved with the standard FTPL algorithm of Kalai and
Vempala [32]. The theorem above shows that the same approach extends even if the relaxed objective does
not reduce to an online linear optimization problem but to a problem that can be tackled by our Generalized
FTPL, providing a potential avenue for obtaining vanishing C-REGRET for values of C ≥ 12 .
6.2 Approximation by Maximal-in-Range Algorithms
Another interesting class of approximation algorithms is Maximal-in-Range (MIR) algorithms. An MIR
algorithm commits to a set of feasible solutions X ′ ⊆ X independently of the input to the algorithm and
outputs the best solution x ∈ X ′. That is, an MIR C-approximation algorithm forms an approximation
oracle C-OPT(f,X )(S) = OPT(f,X ′)(S, 0) for any S. Consider an MIR approximation algorithm and ΓX
translation matrix that is admissible and implementable for X . Clearly, ΓX restricted to the set of rows
in X ′ (denoted by ΓX ′) is also admissible and implementable for any X ′ ⊆ X . In fact ΓX ′ is (κ′, δ′)
admissible for κ′ ≤ κ and 1δ′ ≤ 1δ . Thus even better regret guarantees could be achievable if one uses the
smaller admissibility quantities of matrix ΓX ′ . Therefore, an MIR C-approximation algorithm leads to an
efficient online algorithm with vanishing C-REGRET. In Section 7.1, we demonstrate an example where a
better approximate regret bound is obtained using smaller admissibility quantities.
More formally we have:
Theorem 6.3. Let ΓX ′ ∈ [0, 1]|X ′|×N be (κ′, δ′)-admissible and implementable with complexity g(N,T ).
Let D be the uniform distribution on [0, 1/η] for η =
√
δ′/(2Tκ′). Then, the Oracle-Based Generalized
FTPL algorithm with D, datasets that implement ΓX ′ (or equivalently datasets that implement ΓX ) and
an MIR approximation oracle OPT(f,X ′) is oracle-efficient with per-round complexity O(T + g(N,T )) and
regret
C-REGRET ≤ 2N
√
2Tκ′/δ′.
7 Additional Applications and Connections
In this section, we discuss an application of our oracle efficient learning approach to the problem of online
welfare maximization in multi-unit auctions, to no-regret learning in simultaneous second price auctions,
26
and discuss the connections between our notions of admissibility and implementability with other statistical
measures of complexity from learning theory.
For readability, we use superscript (t), as opposed to the subscript t, to index the time step throughout
this section.
7.1 Polynomial Algorithm for Online Welfare Maximization in Multi-Unit Auctions
In this section, we consider the class of single-item multi-unit auctions that has 1/2-approximation Maximal-
in-Range (MIR) algorithm. We show how the results of Section 6 can be applied to this problem to achieve
a truly polynomial time online algorithm with vanishing 12 -REGRET.
We consider an online learning variant of an n-bidder multi-unit environment, better modeled as a set of
s identical items. Each bidder i has a monotonic valuation function vi : [s]→ [0, 1]. In other words, bidder
i has marginal valuation µi(`) for receiving its `th item and the total utility of bidder i for receiving qi items
is vi(qi) =
∑qi
`=1 µi(`). Here we consider the case where s is much larger than n and the goal is to find an
allocation q ∈ Zn, subject to∑ni=1 qi = s, that maximizes the total welfare∑ni=1 vi(qi) in time polynomial
in n and log(s). In the online learning setting, every day t a fresh set of bidders arrive with new valuations vti
and the learner commits to an allocation of the units of the item to the players, prior to seeing the valuations.
The goal of the learner is to pick an allocation each day that competes with the best in hindsight allocation.
It is not hard to see that the offline welfare maximization problem in this setting corresponds to the Knap-
sack problem, where each player has a valuation equal to the average value in hindsight, i.e., 1T
∑T
t=1 v
(t)
i (·).
So, dynamic programming can be used to compute a welfare-maximizing allocation in time polynomial in
n and s. Dobzinski and Nisan [15] introduced a 1/2-approximation MIR algorithm for this problem. At a
high level, the algorithm proceeds by dividing the set of items to n2 bundles of size s/n2.7 Then, the MIR
algorithm chooses the best allocation from the set of allocations (range of the algorithm) where all the items
in one bundle are allocated to the same bidders. This algorithm is effectively solving a knapsack problem
over n2 items and can be implemented in time polynomial in n and log(s).
We show how to construct a matrix ΓMU that is admissible and implementable for unrestricted n-bidder
s-unit auctions. We then use Theorem 6.3 to obtain an online algorithm with vanishing 12 -REGRET that runs
in time poly(n, T, log s).
Construction of Γ: Let ΓMU be a matrix with n columns, such that for any allocation q and any column
j, ΓMUqj = qj/s. Let Γ
MU′ be the restriction of matrix ΓMU to the rows that represent the range of the
1/2-approximation algorithm of Dobzinski and Nisan [15].
Clearly, for any q 6= q′ we have ΓMUq 6= ΓMUq′ . So, ΓMU is (s + 1, 1s )-admissible. Moreover, observe
that the matrix ΓMU
′
restricted to the range of the 1/2 approximation algorithm of Dobzinski and Nisan [15]
has much better admissibility constants. In particular, the number of different entries within each column is
at most κ′ = n2 + 1, since each player receives allocations that are multiples of s/n2 and there are at most
n2 + 1 such multiples. Moreover, the minimum non-zero difference of the column entries, between any two
such bundled allocations, is at least δ′ ≥ s
n2
1
s =
1
n2
. Therefore matrix ΓMU
′
is
(
n2 + 1, 1
n2
)
-admissible.
It is not hard to see that ΓMU is also implementable with complexity 1. For any column j, consider
the bid profile vj where bidder j’s marginal valuation for any item is 1/s and all other bidders have 0
valuation for any number of items. That is, µj(`) = 1/s and µi(`) = 0 for all ` and i 6= j. The welfare
of any allocation on this bid profile is the utility of bidder j, which is qj/s = ΓMUqj . Therefore, Γ
MU is
implementable with complexity 1 using datasets Sj = {(1,vj)} for all j ∈ [n]. As a result, ΓMU′ is also
implementable with complexity 1 using the same datasets.
The next theorem is a direct consequence of the above discussion.
7If s is not a multiple of n2, one can add extra items with marginal value of 0 to all bidders.
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Theorem 7.1. Consider the problem of welfare maximization in s-unit auctions. Let D be the uniform
distribution on [0, 1/η] for η =
√
δ′/(2Tκ′) =
√
1
2Tn2(n2+1)
. Then, for any sequence of valuation func-
tions v(1), . . . ,v(T ), the Oracle-Based Generalized FTPL algorithm with datasets that implement matrix
ΓMU
′
, distribution D, and the 1/2-approximate MIR algorithm of [15] as an oracle, runs in per-round time
poly(n, log(s), T ) and plays the sequence of allocations q(1), . . . ,q(T ), such that
1
2
-REGRET =E
1
2
 max
q∈Zn:
‖q‖1=s
T∑
t=1
n∑
i=1
v
(t)
i (qi)
− T∑
t=1
n∑
i=1
v
(t)
i (q
(t)
i )
≤ n · 2n√2T (n2 + 1)n2 ≤ O(n4√T ).
In the above theorem, the extra factor of n in the regret as compared to that implied by Theorem 6.3, is
due to the fact that the maximum welfare in this problem is upper bounded by n.
7.2 Oracle Efficient No-Regret Learning in Simultaneous Second Price Auctions
In this section, we answer an open problem raised by Daskalakis and Syrgkanis [13] regarding the exis-
tence of an oracle-based no-regret algorithm for optimal bidding in Simultaneous Second-Price Auctions.
We show that our Oracle-Based Generalized FTPL algorithm used with an appropriate implementable and
admissible translation matrix can be used to obtain such an algorithm.
A Simultaneous Second-Price Auction (SiSPA) [4, 11, 17] is a mechanism for allocating k items to n
bidders. Each bidder i ≤ n submits k simultaneous bids denoted by a vector of bids bi. The mechanism
allocates each item using a second-price auction based on the bids solely submitted for this item, while
breaking ties in favor of bidders with larger indices. For each item j, the winner is charged pj , the second
highest bid for that item. Each bidder i has a fixed combinatorial valuation function vi : {0, 1}k → [0, 1] over
bundles of items. Then, the total utility of bidder i who is allocated the bundle qi ∈ {0, 1}k is vi(qi)−p ·qi,
where p is the vector of second largest bids across all items.
We consider the problem of optimal bidding in a SiSPA from the perspective of the first bidder. Hereafter,
we drop the indices of the players from the notation. From this perspective, the utility of the bidder only
depends on its bid b and the threshold vector p of the second largest bids. The online optimal bidding
problem is defined as follows.
Definition 7.2 (Online Bidding in SiSPAs [45]). At each time step t, the player picks a bid vector b(t)
and an adversary picks a threshold vector p(t). The player wins the bundle of items q(b(t),p(t)), with
qj(b
(t),p(t)) = 1
(b
(t)
j >p
(t)
j )
and gets the utility
u(b(t),p(t)) = v
(
q(b(t),p(t))
)
− p(t) · q.
We consider this problem under the no-overbidding condition that requires that for any bundle q, the
sum of bids over items in q does not exceed the bidder’s valuation for q, i.e., b(t) · q ≤ v(q), for all
q ∈ {0, 1}k. Similar no-overbidding assumptions are used in the previous work to prove that no-regret
learning in second-price auctions has good welfare guarantees [11, 17].
We consider the online bidding problem where for any q, the valuation v(q) ∈ {0, 1/m, . . . ,m/m} and
for any item j ≤ k, bj is a multiple of 1/m. We represent by Bm the class of all such bid vectors that satisfy
the no-overbidding condition for v(·). Note that the assumption on the valuation function is not restrictive.
That is, for any valuation function v(·), one can round down its values to the closest multiple of 1/m, while
losing at most 1/m utility. Moreover, a similar discretization for the bid vectors was used by Daskalakis and
Syrgkanis [45] for studying offline and online optimal bidding in SiSPAs.
Next, we show how to construct an implementable and admissible translation matrix for Bm.
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Construction of Γ: Let ΓOB be a matrix with k columns and |Bm| rows that are equal to bid vectors, i.e.,
ΓOBb = b.
The next lemma, whose detailed proof appears in Appendix F, shows that ΓOB is admissible and imple-
mentable.
Lemma 7.3. ΓOB is (m+ 1, 1/m)-admissible and implementable with complexity m.
Proof Sketch. Since the bids are discretized, the construction of ΓOB yields (m + 1, 1/m)-admissibility,
immediately. At a high level, to implement the jth column, we consider threshold vectors in which pj = `/m
for ` = 0, 1, . . . ,m − 1, and all other thresholds are set to the highest level. In such threshold vectors,
the bidder can win at most one item, item j. Furthermore, whenever the bidder wins item j, its utility is
independent of the bid vector, as it only depends on the valuation v(ej) and the entry pj of the threshold
vector. So, there are weights such that the total contribution of weighted threshold vectors towards the utility
of any winning bid is the same across all `. Since bid bj wins item j for all `/m < bj , then the total utility
of playing bj against this weighted set of threshold vectors is proportional to bj = ΓOBbj . This implies that
ΓOB is implementable.
The next theorem is a direct consequence of Lemma 7.3 and Theorems 2.5 and 2.9.
Theorem 7.4. Consider the problem of Online Bidding in SiSPAs. Let D be the uniform distribution as
described in Theorem 2.5. Then, the Oracle-Based Generalized FTPL algorithm with D and datasets that
implement ΓOB is oracle-efficient with per-round complexity poly(k,m, T ) and has regret
E
[
max
b∈Bm
T∑
t=1
u(b,p(t))−
T∑
t=1
u(b(t),p(t))
]
≤ O(km
√
T ).
7.3 Universal Identification Sequences
There is an interesting connection between our definitions of admissibility and implementability and a sta-
tistical measure of complexity from learning theory, called the Universal Identification Sequences.
Definition 7.5 (Universal Identification Sequences [19]). Consider a domain Z and a class of functions F
mapping from Z to {0, 1}. A set of unlabeled instances Z ′ ⊆ Z is said to distinguish function f ∈ F if f is
the only function that is consistent with the labeling on Z ′ produced by f . A set of unlabeled instances Z ′ is
called a universal identification sequence if it distinguishes every f ∈ F .
Any universal identification sequence ofF can be used to construct a translation matrix that is admissible
and implementable. Consider a matrix ΓF , whose rows are indexed by F and columns are indexed by Z ′,
such that ΓFfz = f(z) for any f ∈ F and z ∈ Z ′. By the definition of universal identification sequence
for any two functions, f, f ′ ∈ F there is z ∈ Z ′, such that f(z) 6= f ′(z), i.e., ΓFf 6= ΓFf ′ . As a results ΓF
is (2, 1)-admissible. Moreover, the columns of ΓF correspond to the value of functions applied to z ∈ Z ′.
Therefore, ΓF is implementable with complexity 1 using datasets Sz = {(1, z)} for all z ∈ Z ′. That is,
the length of a universal identification sequence is an upper bound on the number of columns needed to
create a translation matrix that is admissible and implementable for a class of binary functions. Examples of
function classes with polynomial-length universal identification sequences include logarithmic-depth read-
once majority formulas and logarithmic-depth read-once positive NAND formulas [19]. The next corollary
is a direct consequence of Theorems 2.5 and 2.9.
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Corollary 7.6. Consider a domain Z and a class of binary functions F with a universal identification
sequence Z ′ of length d. Let D be the uniform distribution as described in Theorem 2.5. Then, the Oracle-
Based Generalized FTPL algorithm with D and datasets that implements ΓF is oracle-efficient with per-
round complexity poly(d, T ) and has regret
E
[
max
f∈F
T∑
t=1
f(z(t))−
T∑
t=1
f (t)(z(t))
]
≤ O(d
√
T ).
Our condition on the existence of admissible and implementable matrices is very similar to the existence
of short universal identification sequences. In particular, when f is a boolean function these two notions
are equivalent. However, our Oracle-Based Generalized FTPL algorithm goes beyond the use of binary
functions and universal identification sequences. In particular, we applied our results to obtain no-regret
algorithms for several real-valued function classes. Furthermore, we introduced implementable translation
matrices where each column corresponds to a complex weighted set of adversary’s actions, rather than,
columns that correspond to individual adversary’s actions.
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A Further Related Work
Online Learning Study of online no-regret algorithms goes back to the seminal work of Hannan [21], who
was the first to develop algorithms with regret poly(|X |)o(T ). Motivated by settings in machine learning,
game theory, and optimization, algorithms with regret log(|X |)o(T ) were later developed by Littlestone and
Warmuth [36] and Freund and Schapire [18]. From the computational perspective, however, algorithms with
runtime that has sub-linear dependence on |X | remained elusive. Hazan and Koren [26] recently showed
such algorithms cannot exist without additional assumptions on the structure of the optimization task. Our
work introduces general structural conditions under which online oracle-efficient learning is possible and
provides oracle-efficient no-regret results in this space.
For the case of linear objective functions, Kalai and Vempala [32] proposed the first oracle-efficient
online algorithm. Their algorithm added perturbations that are independent across dimensions to the histor-
ical cumulative payoff of each action of the learner and then picked the action with the largest perturbed
historical payoff. However, for non-linear functions, this algorithm runs in time poly(|X |).
Daskalakis and Syrgkanis [13] proposed an approach of augmenting the history of an online algorithm
with additional “fake” historical samples of the adversary actions. In particular, the authors show that when
the set of adversary’s actions, Y , is small, one can add a random number of copies of each of the actions of
the adversary to the history and obtain a regret of O(|Y|√T ) with oracle-efficient per-round complexity of
poly(|Y|, T ). However, the adversary’s set of actions is often large in many applications, e.g., applications
to auctions design, where this approach does not lead to a no-regret oracle-efficient algorithm.
Our work fills in this gap, by generalizing and extending the algorithm of Daskalakis and Syrgkanis [13]
with arbitrary set of actions of the adversary that meet the admissibility requirement. Additionally, our work
introduces what can be thought of as a measure of statistical and computational complexity of the problem
that takes into account the effective size of a decomposition of the set of learner’s actions, X , on the actions
of the adversary, Y , not just the size of the learner’s set of actions, as in [18, 32, 36], or the adversary’s set
of actions, as in [13].
Prior to our work, stylized algorithms with improved regret bounds or oracle-efficient learning have
existed in multiple domains. Hazan et al. [28] study the regret bound of the problem of learning from experts,
when the losses of experts are restricted to a low dimensional subspace. They show that one can obtain a
regret bound that only depends on the rank of this space, rather than the number of experts. In another work,
Hazan and Kale [25] study online submodular minimization. They show that it is not necessary to add a
perturbation to each action, but it suffices to add a perturbation on each underlying element of the set. This
is a special case of our approach where Γ is implemented by datasets that include single-element sets.
Contextual learning in the transductive setting using an optimization oracle was previously studied
by Kakade and Kalai [30], whose work was later extended and improved by Cesa-Bianchi and Shamir
[9]. Syrgkanis et al. [45] further extended the results to more general settings (including the bandit setting)
and introduced the concept of small separator. The concept of small separators is in line with the definition
of admissibility introduced by our work. We show how our algorithm extends to the contextual setting by
building up on the work of Syrgkanis et al. [45]. Contextual bandit [34] with an oracle has also been heavily
studied in recent years (see for example [1, 16, 42, 46]).
Auctions Design The seminal work of Myerson [38] gave a recipe for designing the optimal truthful auc-
tion when the distribution over bidder valuations is completely known to the auctioneer. More recently, a
series of works have focused on what can be done if the the distribution is not fully known to the auctioneer,
but the auctioneer has access to some historical data. These approaches have focused on the sample com-
plexity [12, 37] and computationally efficiency [14] of designing optimal auctions from sample valuations.
That is, they answer how much data is needed for one to design a near optimal auction for a distribution.
They use tools from supervised learning, such as pseudo-dimension [41] (a variant of VC dimension for
real-valued functions) and compression bounds [35]. These tools are specially appropriate for when histori-
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cal data in form of i.i.d samples from a distribution is available to the learner and their use does not extend to
the adversarial online learning setting which we study. Our work drops any distributional assumptions and
considers learning the best auction among a class of auctions in the adversarial setting. However, we show
that our algorithms can be used to obtain sample complexity results for more general stochastic settings,
such as fast mixing markov processes.
On a different front, a series of works have considered online learning in auctions and pricing mech-
anisms, when the size of the auction class is itself small. Variations of this problem have been studied by
Blum and Hartline [5], Cesa-Bianchi et al. [8], Kleinberg and Leighton [33]. In this case, standard no-regret
algorithms (e.g., [18, 32]) obtain some no-regret results in polynomial time. However, additional effort is
needed to design stylized algorithms for individual auction classes that obtain optimal regret, possibly even
when the learner receives limited historical feedback. Our approach on the other hand works with classes of
auctions that have exponentially large cardinality, thereby allowing one to use more expressive auctions to
gain higher revenue.
More recently, Roughgarden and Wang [44] studied online learning in the class of single-item second-
price auctions with bidder-specific reserves. The authors introduce an algorithm with performance that ap-
proaches a constant factor of the optimal revenue in hindsight. Our work goes beyond this auction class and
introduces a general adversarial framework for auction design.
B Proof of Theorem 2.9
To show that the Oracle-Based FTPL procedure (Algorithm 2) implements Generalized FTPL (Algorithm 1)
with  = 1√
T
, it suffices to show that at each round t, for any x,
t−1∑
τ=1
f(x, yτ ) + α · Γx ≥ max
x∈X
[
t−1∑
τ=1
f(x, yτ ) + α · Γx
]
−  ⇐⇒
∑
(w,y)∈Sj
wf(x, y) ≥ max
x∈X
∑
(w,y)∈Sj
wf(x, y)− ,
(9)
Note that if the above equation holds, then at each timestep, the set of actions that OPT(S, ) can return
legally, i.e., actions whose payoffs are an approximation of the optimal payoff, is exactly the same as the
set of actions that the offline optimization step of Algorithm 1 can legally play. Clearly, if oracle OPT and
Algorithm 1 employ the same tie breaking rule, then Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2 play the same action
at every time step. Even if they do not use the same tie-breaking rule, the guarantee over the payoff of
Algorithm 2 still holds, as the proof of Theorem 2.5 does not rely on using any specific tie-breaking rules.
Therefore, the theorem is proved if Equation (9) holds.
Let us show that Equation (9) is indeed true. For S =
{
(1, y1), . . . , (1, yt−1)
} ∪⋃j≤N αjSj . Consider
any x, x′ ∈ X . Then, from the definition of S and by implementability,
∑
(w,y)∈S
wf(x, y)−
∑
(w,y)∈S
wf(x′, y) =
t−1∑
τ=1
[
f(x, yτ )− f(x′, yτ )
]
+
∑
j∈[N ]
αj
∑
(w,y)∈Sj
w
(
f(x, y)− f(x′, y))
=
t−1∑
τ=1
[
f(x, yτ )− f(x′, yτ )
]
+
∑
j∈[N ]
αj(Γxj − Γx′j)
=
(
t−1∑
τ=1
f(x, yτ ) + α · Γx
)
−
(
t−1∑
τ=1
f(x′, yτ ) + α · Γx′
)
,
which immediately yields Equation (9).
Also, by implementability, the running time to construct the set S is at most T + NM . Since there is
only one oracle call per round, we get the per-round complexity of T +NM .
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C Omitted Proofs From Applications to Online Auction Design
C.1 Proof of Lemma 3.2
Proof. In the interest of readability, we drop the superscript and write Γ for ΓVCG in this proof.
For any r, row Γr corresponds to the binary encoding of r1, . . . , rn. Therefore, for any two different
auctions r 6= r′, Γr 6= Γr′ . Since Γ is a binary matrix, this implies that Γ is (2, 1)-admissible.
Next, we prove that Γ is implementable. Pick i ≤ n and β ≤ dlogme, and the associated column index
j. We will construct the set Sj for each column j ≤ ndlog(m)e for implementing Γ. The set Sj includes
exactly the m profiles in which only the bidder i has non-zero valuation, denoted as vh := (h/m)ei for
h ≤ m. To determine their weights wh, we use the definition of implementability. In particular, the weights
must satisfy:
∀ r, r′ ∈ Im, Γrj − Γr′j =
∑
h≤m
wh
(
Rev(r,vh)− Rev(r′,vh)
)
.
In the above equation, Γrj and Γr′j encode the βth bit of ri and r′i, respectively, so the left-hand side is
independent of the reserve prices for bidders i′ 6= i. Moreover, Rev(r,vh) = ri1(h≥mri), so the right-hand
side of the above equation is also independent of the reserve prices for bidders i′ 6= i. Let zβ be the βth
bit of integer z. That is, Γrj = (mri)β . Substituting z = mri and z′ = mr′i, the above equation can be
reformulated as
∀z, z′ ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, (zβ − z′β) = ∑
h≤m
wh
(
z
m
1(h≥z) −
z′
m
1(h≥z′)
)
.8 (10)
We next recursively derive the weights wh, and show that they are non-negative and satisfy Equation (10).
To begin, let
wm = max
{
0, max
z
[
m
(
zβ − (z − 1)β
)]}
,
and for all z = m,m− 1, . . . , 2, define
wz−1 =
1
z − 1
(
m∑
h=z
wh −m
(
zβ − (z − 1)β
))
.
Next, we show by induction that wh ≥ 0 for all h. For the base case of h = m, by definition wm ≥ 0. Now,
assume that for all h ≥ z, wh ≥ 0. Then
wz−1 ≥ 1
z − 1
(
wm −m
(
zβ − (z − 1)β
)) ≥ 0.
Therefore all weights are non-negative. Furthermore, by rearranging the definition of wz−1, we have
(
zβ − (z − 1)β
)
=
1
m
(
m∑
h=z
wh − (z − 1)wz−1
)
=
1
m
(
z
m∑
h=z
wh − (z − 1)
m∑
h=z−1
wh
)
=
∑
h≤m
wh
(
z
m
1(h≥z) −
z − 1
m
1(h≥z−1)
)
.
Where in the second equality we simply added and subtracted the term (z − 1)∑mh=z wh and in the last
equality, we grouped together common terms.
8Not including the reserve 0 is a crucial technical point for the proof of implementability.
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Equation (10) is proved for a particular pair z > z′ by summing the above expression for
(
ζβ−(ζ−1)β
)
over all ζ ∈ (z′, z] and canceling telescoping terms, and if z = z′, the statement holds regardless of the
weights chosen.
This shows that Γ is implementable. Note that the cardinality of Sj is at most m. Also note that the
above proof constructs (in poly(n,m) time) such datasets {Sj}j∈[ndlogme] that implement Γ. Therefore, Γ
is implementable with complexity m using the datasets described above.
C.2 Proof of Equation (2)
Consider any vector of reserves r ∈ I and let r′ ∈ Im be the vector obtained by rounding each reserve price
down to the nearest multiple of 1/m, except for reserves that lie in the range [0, 1/m), which are rounded
up to 1/m.
First it is easy to see that by rounding up all reserves in r that are below 1/m, up to 1/m, we cannot
decrease the revenue by more than s/m. Let r′′ be this new vector. The reason is that any bidder that is
now not allocated, could only have contributed a payment of at most 1/m. Moreover, the revenue lost from
other allocated bidders by doing this switch is at most 1/m: the payment of another bidder i′, changes
only if his price setter was one of the bidders i that is no longer allocated, because he doesn’t pass his
new reserve r′′i . But then the payment of i
′ was at most 1/m, since the value of i is at most 1/m. Thus
Rev(r,v)− Rev(r′′,v) ≤ s/m.
Now we assume that we start with a reserve price r, such that ri ≥ 1/m for all i, and let r′ be the reserve
vector where all reserves in r are rounded down to the nearest multiple of 1/m. If vi > ri, then vi > r′i, so
any bidder who would have been included in the basic VCG auction using reserves r is still included with
r′. This can only increase the number of bidders who are serviced and therefore pay a charge. We now show
also that the total decrease in payment from bidders with value at least 1/m is at most s/m.
Consider the amount that serviced bidder i is charged. This is the maximum of ri and the highest bid
of a bidder in the basic VCG auction who was not serviced (or 0 if all bidders were serviced); let b denote
this highest unserviced bid in the basic VCG auction under r, and similarly let b′ denote such a bid under r′.
Since the set of bidders entering the basic VCG auction increases from r to r′, we must have b′ ≥ b.
Let U be the set of bidders serviced under r, and U ′ the set under r′. The difference in revenue is∑
i∈U
max{ri, b} −
∑
i∈U ′
max{r′i, b′}
=
∑
i∈U∩U ′
(max{ri, b} −max{r′i, b′}) +
∑
i∈U\U ′
max{ri, b} −
∑
i′∈U ′\U
max{r′i′ , b′}. (11)
We begin by analyzing the last two terms. For any i ∈ U \ U ′ and i′ ∈ U ′ \ U ,
r′i′ + 1/m > ri′ > vi′ ≥ vi > ri,
where vi′ ≥ vi follows, because i enters the basic VCG auction for r′, but is not allocated the item. Therefore,
max{r′i′ , b′} ≥ max
{
ri − 1/m, b
} ≥ max{ri, b} − 1/m.
Since |U \ U ′| ≤ |U ′ \ U |, we can pick V ⊆ U ′ \ U such that |V | = |U \ U ′| and obtain∑
i∈U\U ′
max{ri, b} −
∑
i′∈U ′\U
max{r′i′ , b′} ≤
∑
i∈U\U ′
max{ri, b} −
∑
i′∈V
max{r′i′ , b′} ≤
|U \ U ′|
m
.
Note that each term in the first sum of Equation (11) is at most 1/m, because
max{r′i, b′} ≥ max
{
ri − 1/m, b
} ≥ max{ri, b} − 1/m.
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Thus, we have
Rev(r,v)− Rev(r′,v) ≤ |U ∩ U
′|
m
+
|U \ U ′|
m
≤ s
m
.
Thus if we start from any reserve price vector r, we can first round up to 1/m all reserves that are below
1/m and then round down any other reserve to the nearest multiple of 1/m. The combination of this two
separate modification, can drop the revenue by at most 2s/m. This yields the approximation result
max
r∈I
T∑
t=1
Rev(r,vt)− max
r∈Im
T∑
t=1
Rev(r,vt) ≤ 2Ts
m
. (12)
C.3 Proof of Lemma 3.7
We will argue that the setting here is isomorphic to the setting in the proof of Lemma 3.2, so we can directly
apply the result of analysis of ΓVCG. The isomorphism from the VCG setting to IP setting maps bidders i
in VCG to items ` in IP, and reserve price vectors r to price vectors a. We therefore assume that n in VCG
equals k in IP, and the values of m in both settings are equal. Then, indeed ΓVCG equals ΓIP.
Next we need to show how to construct Sj for all j in the ΓIP setting. Assume that j corresponds to the
bidder i and the bit β in VCG setting, and the item ` and the bit β in IP setting. In VCG, we considered the
bid profiles vh = (h/m)ei, and the revenue of any auction r is
RevVCG(r,vh) = ri1(h≥mri).
In IP setting, we consider profiles v′h of combinatorial valuations over bundles q ∈ {0, 1}k, in which all
bidders have values zero on all bundles and one bidder has value h/m for bundle e` and zero on all other
bundles.9 In this case, we have
RevIP(a,v′h) = ai1(h≥mai).
Thus, both the translation matrices ΓVCG and ΓIP as well as the revenue functions RevVCG and RevIP are
isomorphic (given these choices of the profiles). Therefore, we can set the weights w′h in IP setting equal to
the weights wh in VCG setting and obtain admissibility and implementability with the same constants and
complexity.
C.4 Proof of Lemma 3.9
Single-minded setting. In the single-minded setting, each bidder i is interested in one particular bundle
of items qˆi. That is, vi(qi) = vi(qˆi) for all qi ⊇ qˆi and 0 otherwise. Consider any vector of prices a ∈ P
and let a′ ∈ Pm be the vector obtained by rounding each price down to the nearest multiple of 1/m, except
any price below 1/m, which is rounded up to 1/m. First, it is easy to observe that by rounding item prices
below 1/m up to 1/m, can only lose n · k/m of revenue. In a second step, by then rounding all reserve
prices down to the nearest multiple of 1/m can only lose an extra n · k/m. Since the price of every bundle
is reduced, any bidder i who received bundle qˆi in auction a, also receives qˆi in auction a
′. So, the revenue
of the mechanism reduces by at most 2nk/m. That is,
max
a∈P
T∑
t=1
Rev(a,vt)− max
a∈Pm
T∑
t=1
Rev(a,vt) ≤ 2Tnk
m
.
9 Note that a simple variation of this bid profile can be used in settings where the valuations need to satisfy additional assump-
tions, such as (sub-)additivity or free disposal. In such cases, we can use a similar bid profile where one bidder has valuation h/m
for any bundle that includes item ` and all other valuations are 0.
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Unit-demand setting. In the unit-demand setting with infinite supply, each bidder i has vi(e`) for item `,
and wishes to purchase at most one item, i.e., item arg max` (vi(e`)− a`). We show that for any a ∈ P there
is a′′ ∈ Pm such that for any valuation profile v, Rev(a,v)−Rev(a′′,v) ≤ O(nk/m). At a high level, we
first choose a′, with a′` ∈ {0, 1/m, · · · ,m/m}, as discounted prices such that items with higher prices are
discounted at higher rates. It is not hard to see that under this condition, no bidder purchases a less expensive
item in auction a′. So, the loss in the revenue of the auction is bounded by the discount on the items. Using
this intuition, it is sufficient to find a′, with a` ∈ {0, 1/m, · · · ,m/m}, such that a` ≥ a′` ≥ a` − O(1/m)
for all ` ≤ k, and a` − a′` > a`′ − a′`′ when a` > a`′ . We then show how to derive a′′ ∈ Pm whose revenue
is at least as good as a′.
In the following, we provide one such mapping between a and a′ ∈ Pm that has an additive approxima-
tion guarantee. Hartline and Koltun [23] also provided a discretization of P that has multiplicative approxi-
mation guarantee, but using a discretized set different from Pm.
Without loss of generality, assume a1 ≤ a2 ≤ · · · ≤ ak. For ease of exposition, let  = 1/m. To begin,
let a′1 be the largest multiple of  less than or equal to a1. For ` = 2, . . . , k, let a′` be the largest multiple of 
less than or equal to a` such that a`− a′` ≥ a`−1− a′`−1. Note that a′` is well defined, since we can begin by
considering a′` = a
′
`−1 and then increase by  until the condition is violated. This construction means that
pricing of items with a larger ` is more attractive in a′ than it was in a. Thus, no bidder that prefers an item
` under a, would prefer any item `′ < ` under a′. Therefore, the revenue obtained from the bidder i who
prefers ` under a is at least a′` under a
′, which implies the bound
Rev(a,v)− Rev(a′,v) ≤ nmax
`≤k
(a` − a′`).
To complete the proof, we argue by induction that a` − a′` ≤ `. This clearly holds for ` = 1. For ` ≥ 2,
the definition of a′`, in the absence of discretization to , would yield a
′
` = a` − (a`−1 − a′`−1). With the
discretization, we have
a′` ≥ a` − (a`−1 − a′`−1)−  ≥ a` − (`− 1)−  = a` − `,
where we used the inductive hypothesis at `− 1.
Next, we construct a′′, such that a′′` =  if a
′
` = 0 and a
′′
` = a
′
`, otherwise. We show that any bidder i
that purchased some item ` in auction a′ with price a′` ≥ , purchases item ` in auction a′′ as well.
Assume to the contrary that bidder i purchases another item `′. Since there is infinite supply, bidder i
could have purchased item `′ in auction a′, but preferred to purchase item `. Therefore,
vi(e`)− a′` ≥ vi(e`′)− a′`′ .
Note that a′′` = a
′
` and a
′′
`′ ≥ a′`′ for all `′ 6= `. So,
vi(e`)− a′′` ≥ vi(e`′)− a′′`′ .
Therefore, bidder i purchases item ` in auction a′′ as well.
Since only the bidder who receive items at price 0 may not be allocated the same items, we have that
Rev(a′′,v) ≥ Rev(a′,v). This completes the proof.
C.5 Proof of Lemma 3.12
Since ΓSLθ,v = Rev(θ,v), Γ
SL can be implemented by datasets Sv = {(1,v)} for v ∈ V . So, Γ is imple-
mentable with complexity 1.
Take any two different auctions θ and θ′. We show that ΓSLθ 6= ΓSLθ′ . Let b be the smallest level at which
there is i ∈ [n] such that θib 6= θ′ib and among such i choose the largest. There are three cases (see Figure 3
for Cases 1 and 2):
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Figure 3: Demonstrating cases 1 and 2 of prof of Lemma 3.12. The bidder valuations are demonstrated by
blue circles on the real line and the revenue of the two auctions θ and θ′ are demonstrated by red solid
vertical line.
1. i 6= n: Consider the bid profile vi,` for ` = mθnb . By the choice of i and the fact that i 6= n, we have
that bθn(v
i,`
n ) = bθ
′
n (v
i,`
n ) = b. On the other hand, bθi (v
i,`
i ) = s − 1 ≥ b. Therefore, bidder i wins the
item in both auctions and pays the bth threshold. So, Rev(θ,vi,`) = θib 6= θ′ib = Rev(θ′,vi,`).
2. i = n and b ≥ 1: Without loss of generality, assume that θnb < θ′nb . Let ` = mθnb and consider v1,`.
Then bθn(v
1,`
n ) = b and bθ
′
n (v
1,`
n ) = b′ for some b′ < b. So, bidder 1 wins the item in both auctions and
pays the threshold that corresponds to the nth bidder’s level. Therefore, Rev(θ,v1,`) = θ1b 6= θ1b′ =
Rev(θ′,v1,`).
3. i = n and b = 0: Consider bid profile en. In this profile, bidder n wins and pays the absolute reserve
price. Therefore, Rev(θ, en) = θn0 6= θ′n0 = Rev(θ′, en).
Therefore, ΓSLθ 6= ΓSLθ′ . Since any element of ΓSL is a multiple of 1/m, ΓSL is (m+ 1, 1m)-admissible.
D Omitted Proofs of Section 4
D.1 Proof of Lemma 4.1
Proof. Let x∗ = arg maxx∈X Ey∼F [f(x, y)]. By the definition of regret we have that for any y1, . . . , yT ,
T∑
t=1
Ext [f(xt, yt)] ≥ sup
x∈X
T∑
t=1
f(x, yt)− REGRET ≥
T∑
t=1
f(x∗, yt)− REGRET. (13)
Observe that the random variables Zt = f(x∗, yt) are drawn i.i.d. with expected value Ey∼F [f(x∗, y)] and
are bounded in [0, 1]. Hence, by the Hoeffding bound, we get that with probability at least 1− 2e−2T2 :
1
T
T∑
t=1
f(x∗, yt) ≥ Ey∼F [f(x∗, y)]− . (14)
By setting  =
√
log(2/δ)
2T and combining the two bounds we get the result.
D.2 Proof of Lemma 4.3
Proof. Let x∗ = arg maxx∈X Ey∼F [f(x, y)]. By the definition of regret we have that for any sequence
y1, . . . , yT ,
T∑
t=1
Ext [f(xt, yt)] ≥ sup
x∈X
T∑
t=1
f(x, yt)− REGRET ≥
T∑
t=1
f(x∗, yt)− REGRET. (15)
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Since y1, . . . , yT are a Markov chain, by applying Theorem 4.2 to this chain and to the function f(x∗, ·), we
obtain that with probability at least 1− 2 exp
(
− Tγ24+10
)
,
1
T
T∑
t=1
f(x∗, yt) ≥ Ey∼F [f(x∗, y)]− . (16)
If we set  =
√
14 log(2/δ)
γT then we have, either  > 1, in which case the inequality is trivial, since f(x, y) ∈
[0, 1], or if  ≤ 1, then  =
√
14 log(2/δ)
γT ≥
√
(4+10) log(2/δ)
γT , which implies that the inequality holds with
probability 1− δ.
D.3 Proof of Equation (6)
We set out to prove
max
θ∈Ss,m
Ev∼F [Rev(θ,v)] ≥ OPT(F )− 3, (17)
for m = 1/2 and s = 1/.
Let us first briefly mention two existing approaches to proving similar results using different discretiza-
tion sets.
Let Rs,m be the set of s-level auctions with discretization level m, as described in Definition 3.11,
with the exception that consecutive thresholds can be equal. Morgenstern and Roughgarden [37] aim for
a multiplicative approximation guarantee and show that when distributions Fi are bounded in [1, H] and
s = Ω(1 + log1+H),
max
θ∈Rs,∞
Ev∼F [Rev(θ,v)] ≥ (1− )OPT(F ).
Note that this result uses the set of auctions Rs,∞, i.e., the thresholds can be set at any real values and
consecutive thresholds may be equal, rather than in the discretization grid Ss,m for a finitem and no repeated
thresholds. On the other hand, Devanur et al. [14] show that the valuations of the bidders can be discretized
with only a small loss in the revenue of the optimal auction. That is, if F ′ is a product distribution obtained
by rounding down each v ∼ F to the closest power of (1− ), then OPT(F ′) ≥ (1− )OPT(F ).
We use a combination of these results to prove our claim. In particular, we use a variant of the approach
of Devanur et al. [14] to obtain an  additive approximation guarantee by discretizing the valuations of
the bidders, not the auctions, at a discrete grid. We then use a variant of the approach of Morgenstern and
Roughgarden [37] to approximate the optimal auction on these valuations using the grid Rs,∞. Since the
valuations of the bidders are discretized themselves, we show how to discretize the thresholds of the optimal
auction to the set of auctions in Rs,1/, while losing only a small additive term. Finally, we show how to
use a finer grid and approximate the revenue of the optimal auction using level auctions that have distinct
thresholds, i.e., Ss,1/2 .
First, let F ′ be a product distribution obtained by rounding down each v ∼ F to the closest multiple
of . We show that OPT(F ′) ≥ OPT(F ) − . The proof is an analogue of Lemma 5 of [14] for additive
approximation.
Lemma D.1. Given any product distribution F = F1 × . . . × Fn, let F ′ be the distribution obtained by
rounding down the values from F to the closest multiple of . Then OPT (F ′) ≥ OPT (F )− .
Proof. Let M be the optimal Myerson auction for F and let M ′ be the following mechanism for allocating
items to v′ ∼ F ′: Take v such that 1 − Fi(vi) = 1 − F ′i (v′i) for all i ∈ [n] and allocate the item according
to the outcome of mechanism M on v. Charge the winner the minimum value above which it would remain
a winner.
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To analyze the revenue of M ′, we will think of the expected revenue in terms of quantiles. The quantile
of a distribution Fi is defined as ci(vi) = 1 − Fi(vi). So instead of thinking of an auction in terms of the
allocation as a function of values, we can think of it in terms of quantiles and we can write vi(c) = c−1i (c)
as the value that corresponds to quantile c. Then we can express the expected revenue as Ec[Rev(M,v(c)],
where each quantile ci is drawn uniformly in [0, 1].
Consider any vector of quantiles c ∈ [0, 1]n and let v and v′ be the values in F and F ′ corresponding
to these quantiles, i.e., 1 − Fi(vi) = 1 − F ′i (v′i) = ci for all i ∈ [n]. Note that, allocation of M on v is the
same as the allocation of M ′ on v′. Moreover, the payment of a truthful mechanism is the threshold value
of the winner above which he still remains allocated. Therefore, for any such quantile the payment in F and
F ′ differ by at most . This proves that OPT(F ′) ≥ OPT(F )− .
Next, we show that there is θ ∈ R1/,∞ such that Ev∼F ′ [Rev(θ,v)] ≥ OPT(F ′)−. This is an analogue
of Theorem 3.4 in Morgenstern and Roughgarden [37], but for additive approximation, which enables us to
drop some strong assumptions made in Morgenstern and Roughgarden [37] on the support of the distribution.
Lemma D.2. Consider any product distribution F = F1 × . . . × Fn, where each Fi has support in [0, 1].
We have that:
max
θ∈R1/,∞
Ev∼F [Rev(θ,v)] ≥ OPT(F )− . (18)
Proof. For each i, let φi(·) be the ironed virtual valuation function for bidder i with respect to Fi (see [22]).
These φi(·) are non-decreasing functions. Let θ be such that θib = φ−1i (b · ) for b ∈ {0, 1, . . . , s − 1}
(where the inverse is defined as the left-most value v for which φi(v) = b · ). Observe that with such a
vector of thresholds, the s-level auction is essentially approximating the virtual value functions to within
an epsilon error, and then allocating to the player with the highest approximate virtual value function. In
particular, observe that a player i in this s-level auction is assigned level b if his ironed virtual value φi(vi),
is in interval [b, (b+ 1)), or in [b, 1] if b = s− 1.
Next, we show that for any v, Rev(θ,v) ≥ OPT(F ) − . Consider v ∼ F and let i∗ and i′ be the
winners in θ and the Myerson optimal auctions respectively. Moreover, observe that in both auctions the
allocation of a player can be determined as a function of his ironed virtual value (rather than directly his
value). Thus we can conclude by Theorem 3.18 of [22], that the expected revenue of both auctions is equal
to their expected ironed virtual value (not only upper bounded by it). So, we have that:
Ev∼F [Rev(θ,v)] = Ev∼F [φi∗(vi∗)] and OPT(F ) = Ev∼F [φi′(vi′)].
Now, consider the winners i∗ and i′. Note that if i∗ was the unique bidder at the highest bucket under θ
(there were no ties to be broken lexicographically), then i∗ also has the highest ironed virtual valuation, so
i∗ = i′. On the other hand, if i′ was tied with i∗, then φi′(vi′)− φi∗(vi∗) ≤ . So, overall we have
Ev∼F [Rev(θ,v)] = Ev∼F [φi∗(vi∗)] ≥ Ev∼F [φi′(vi′)]−  = OPT(F )− .
We can now combine the above two Lemmas to show Equation (17). From Lemma D.2, starting from
any product distribution F , we can first round down values to the nearest multiple of  to get a distribution
F ′, such OPT(F ′) ≥ OPT(F )− . Then we can apply Lemma D.2, for distribution F ′, to show that
max
θ∈R1/,∞
Ev∼F ′ [Rev(θ,v)] ≥ OPT(F ′)−  ≥ OPT (F )− 2.
Next, observe that since the distribution F ′ is only supported at values that are multiples of , in the above
maximization over threshold levels, it suffices to optimize over thresholds that are multiples of . For any
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other threshold, θib, which is not a multiple of , we can rounded up to the nearest multiple of . This does
not change the allocation of any realized value and it can only increases the payment. Thus:
max
θ∈R1/,1/
Ev∼F ′ [Rev(θ,v)] = max
θ∈R1/,∞
Ev∼F ′ [Rev(θ′,v)] ≥ OPT(F )− 2.
Next, we show that without loss of generality, we can consider those auctions in θ ∈ R1/,1/ where for each
bidder i, only θi0 can be set at value 0 and no other threshold. Consider θ such that θ
i
0 =, . . . , θ
i
b = 0. Note
that no payment in such an auction falls in the bucket b− 1 of bidder i′ < i or bucket b of i′ > i. Therefore,
one can remove thresholds θi1, · · · , θib and the corresponding thresholds for bidders i′ without changing the
allocation or payment on any valuation. Therefore, in the remainder of this proof, we assumes that R1/,1/
is restricted to auctions with no repeated thresholds on value 0.
Note that the thresholds created above fall in the set R1/,1/, that is they may have consecutive thresh-
olds that are equal (however, not on value 0). Instead, consider level auctions at a finer grid value, S1/,1/2 .
For any θ ∈ R1/,1/, consider a θ′ ∈ S1/,1/2 such that the equal threshold in θ are spread in the 1 dis-
cretization levels between the two discretization levels of θ. That is, for any bidder i and any ` ∈ [1/], all the
thresholds of bidder i that are equal to ` are spread to get distinct values {(`−1)+2, (`−1)+22, · · · , `}
in θ′. Since auction θ has 1 levels, all levels are distinct in θ
′, and since θ has at most one threshold on value
0, no negative value thresholds are created in θ′. Moreover, because the valuations in F ′ are themselves dis-
cretized at multiples of , no bid changes level and the allocation in θ is the same as θ′. So, the revenue of
any valuation drops by at most . Therefore,
max
θ∈S1/,1/2
Ev∼F ′ [Rev(θ,v)] ≥ max
θ∈R1/,1/
Ev∼F ′ [Rev(θ,v)]− .
Finally, since valuations of F are rounded down to valuations in F ′, we have that under F , any s-level
auction can only yield higher revenue than under F ′, because F has point-wise higher values than F . Hence:
max
θ∈S1/,1/2
Ev∼F [Rev(θ,v)] ≥ max
θ∈S1/,1/2
Ev∼F ′ [Rev(θ,v) ≥ OPT(F )− 3.
E Omitted Proofs of Section 5
E.1 Proof of Lemma 5.4
Proof. First we argue that ΓQ has distinct rows. We will show that for any two rows pi, pi′, there exists a
column (σ, j) on which they differ. Since Q is a separator, there must exist one σ∗ ∈ Q on which pi(σ∗) 6=
pi′(σ∗). Now by the admissibility of the original matrix Γ, we know that for any two x, x′ ∈ X , there exists
a column j of the original matrix such that Γx,j 6= Γx′,j . Applying the latter for pi(σ∗), pi′(σ∗) ∈ X , we
get that there exists a j∗, such that Γpi(σ∗),j∗ 6= Γpi′(σ∗),j∗ . By the definition of ΓQ, the latter implies that
ΓQpi,(σ∗,j∗) 6= ΓQpi′,(σ∗,j∗). Thus the two rows pi, pi′ of matrix ΓQ differ at column (σ∗, j∗).
Now we argue that the quantities κ, δ (as defined in Definition 2.2), for the matrix ΓQ are the same as the
quantities for matrix Γ. We remind the reader that κ is the maximum number of distinct elements that appear
in a column and δ is the minimum non-zero absolute difference between any two elements of a column. The
reason that these quantities don’t change is that they depend only on the set of values that appear in a column
and not of the actual vector of values. Moreover, the set of quantities that appear in column (σ, j) of matrix
ΓQ, is a subset of the set of quantities that appear in column j of matrix Γ. Since by taking a subset of the
column we cannot increase the number of distinct elements and the minimum non-zero absolute difference
of any two elements in the set, we conclude that ΓQ is also (κ, δ)-admissible.
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E.2 Proof of Lemma 5.5
Proof. The intuition of the proof is as follows: if we know that we can simulate every column in Γ with
a sequence of polynomially many weighted inputs {(w, y)}, then we can simulate each column of ΓQ
associated with context σ ∈ Q and column j of Γ, by a sequence of weighted contextual inputs {(w, (σ, y))},
which is essentially a contextually annotated copy of the sequence of inputs we used to simulate column j
of Γ. We now show this intuition more formally.
Since Γ is implementable with complexity M , we have that for any column j ∈ {1, . . . , N} of matrix
Γ there exists a weighted dataset Sj = {(w, y)}, with |Sj | ≤M , such that:
for all x, x′ ∈ X : Γxj − Γx′j =
∑
(w,y)∈Sj
w · (f(x, y)− f(x′, y)).
In the contextual learning setting we need to argue that for any column (σ, j) ∈ Q × [N ] of matrix ΓQ
there exists a weighted contextual dataset Scj = {(w, (σ, y)}, with |Scj | ≤M , such that:
for all pi, pi′ ∈ Π: ΓQpi,(σ,j) − ΓQpi′,(σ,j) =
∑
(w,(σ,y))∈Scj
w · (f(pi(σ), y)− f(pi′(σ), y)).
The construction of such a contextual data-set is straightforward: for each (w, y) ∈ Sj , create a data-point
(w, (σ, y)) in Scj . Now observe that:
ΓQpi,(σ,j) − ΓQpi′,(σ,j) = Γpi(σ),j − Γpi′(σ),j =
∑
(w,y)∈Sj
w · (f(pi(σ), y)− f(pi′(σ), y))
=
∑
(w,(σ,y))∈Scj
w · (f(pi(σ), y)− f(pi′(σ), y))
The latter completes the proof.
E.3 Proof of Lemma 5.8
Proof. We will show that for each t ≤ T ,
E[fc(pit+1, (σt, yt))− fc(pit, (σt, yt))] ≤ 2Nκρ. (19)
Since fc(pi, (σt, yt)) = f(pi(σt), yt) and since f(x, y) ∈ [0, 1], it suffices to show that Pr[pit+1(σt) 6=
pit(σt)] ≤ 2Nκρ.
Observe that if pit+1(σt) 6= pit(σt) then it must be that Γpit+1(σt),j 6= Γpit(σt),j , for some j ∈ [N ], by the
admissibility of matrix Γ in the non-contextual setting. Thus we need to show that the probability that there
exists an j such that Γpit+1(σt),j 6= Γpit(σt),j is at most 2Nκρ. By the union bound it suffices to show that for
any given j, the probability that Γpit+1(σt),j 6= Γpit(σt),j is at most 2κρ.
The proof of this fact then follows identical arguments as in the proof of the non-contextual stability
Lemma 2.4 and we omit it for succinctness.
E.4 Proof of Theorem 5.9
Using Lemma 5.8, and since D is uniform over [−ν, ν] and is (1+22νδ , 1+2δ )-dispersed, we have:
E
[
T∑
t=1
f(xt, yt)− f(xt+1, yt)
]
≤ TNκ1 + 2
δν
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It remains to bound the term E
[∑
σ∈P
∑N
j=1 ασ,j(Γ
P
x∗,(σ,j) − ΓPx1,(σ,j))
]
, which is at most
2E
max
x
∑
σ∈P
N∑
j=1
ασ,jΓ
P
x,(σ,j)
 .
Let βx =
∑
σ∈P
∑N
j=1 ασ,jΓ
P
x,(σ,j). We therefore have for any λ > 0,
E
[
max
x
βx
]
= 1λ ln
(
exp
(
λE
[
max
x
βx
]))
≤ 1λ ln
(
E
[
exp
(
λmax
x
βx
)])
(Jensen’s inequality)
≤ 1λ ln
(∑
x
E [exp (λβx)]
)
≤ 1λ ln
∑
x
∏
σ,j
E
[
exp
(
λασ,jΓ
P
x,(σ,j)
)]
≤ 1λ ln
∑
x
∏
σ,j
exp
(
ν2λ2
2
) (Hoeffding’s lemma for bounded r.v.)
=
ln |X |
λ
+
ν2N |P |λ
2
=
√
2N |P | ln |X |ν. (by picking the optimal λ)
Combining the stability and the error bound above and invoking Lemma 2.1, completes the proof.
F Proof of Lemma 7.3
Since ΓOBb = b and b is descretized, Γ
OB is (m + 1, 1/m)-admissible. Next, we argue that ΓOB is
also implementable. Consider column j of ΓOB. We show that datasets Sj for all j that is only sup-
ported on threshold vectors where all but the jth thresholds are set to 1, implement ΓOB. Specifically, for
` = 0, 1, . . . ,m − 1, let pj` = (`/m)ej +
∑
j′ 6=j ej′ . Note that the utility of playing bid b against p
j
` is
u(b,pj`) =
(
v(ej)− `/m
)
1(bj>`/m). We set the weight corresponding to p
j
` to
wj` =
{
1
m · 1v(ej)−`/m if `/m < v(ej)
0 otherwise.
Since bj ≤ v(ej) for any b, we have
m−1∑
`=0
wj` u(b,p
j
`) =
m−1∑
`=0
1
m
· 1
v(ej)− `/m ·
(
v(ej)− `/m
)
1(bj>`/m)
=
m−1∑
`=0
1
m
1(bj>`/m) =
mbj−1∑
`=0
1
m
= bj = Γ
OB
bj .
Thus, indeed Sj = {(wj` ,pj`)}` implements ΓOB. Note that |Sj | ≤ m, so ΓOB is implementable with
complexity m.
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G Approximate Generalized FTPL Lemma
We first prove an approximate variant of Be-the-Leader Lemma.
Lemma G.1 (Be-the-Approximate-Leader Lemma). In the Generalized FTPL algorithm, for any x ∈ X ,
T∑
t=1
f(xt+1, yt) + α · Γx1 ≥
T∑
t=1
f(x, yt) + α · Γx − T.
Proof. For T = 1 the inequality holds trivially, by the definition of x2 = OPT(x1, ). Assume that the claim
holds for some T . Then, for all x
T+1∑
t=1
f(xt+1, yt) + α · Γx1 =
T∑
t=1
f(xt+1, yt) + α · Γx1 + f(xT+2, yT+1)
≥
T∑
t=1
f(xT+2, yt) + α · ΓxT+2 − T + f(xT+2, yT+1)
(by induction hypothesis)
=
T+1∑
t=1
f(xT+2, yt) + α · ΓxT+2 − T
≥
T+1∑
t=1
f(x, yt) + α · Γx − (T + 1), (by approximate optimality of xT+2)
proving the lemma.
Proof of Lemma 2.1. Let x∗ = arg maxx∈X
∑T
t=1 f(x, yt). Then by Lemma G.1,
REGRET = E
[
T∑
t=1
f(x∗, yt)−
T∑
t=1
f(xt, yt)
]
= E
[
T∑
t=1
f(x∗, yt)−
T∑
t=1
f(xt+1, yt)
]
+ E
[
T∑
t=1
f(xt+1, yt)−
T∑
t=1
f(xt, yt)
]
≤ E [α · (Γx1 − Γx∗)] + E
[
T∑
t=1
f(xt+1, yt)−
T∑
t=1
f(xt, yt)
]
+ T.
H Pseudo-Polynomial Oracles and Integral Oracles
H.1 Pseudo-Polynomial Oracles
If the oracle is only a pseudo-polynomial time approximation scheme, then its running time will also depend
on the pseudo-complexity of its input. In that case for instance, the actual size of the weights that are needed
to implement matrix Γ will go into the final running time of the learning algorithm. To capture such types
of oracles, we slightly strengthen our implementability definitions.
Definition H.1. A matrix Γ is implementable with pseudo-complexityW if for each j there exists a weighted
dataset Sj , with |Sj | ≤W and
∑
(w,y)∈Sj w ≤W and such that
for all x, x′ ∈ X : Γxj − Γx′j =
∑
(w,y)∈Sj
w
(
f(x, y)− f(x′, y)).
43
Algorithm 4: Oracle-Based Generalized FTPL with Integral Oracle
Input: dataset Sj , j ∈ N that implement matrix Γ ∈ [0, 1]|X |×N
distribution D with non-negative support.
an offline oracle INTOPT, precision parameter 
Draw αj ∼ D for j = 1, . . . , N .
for t = 1, . . . , T do
For all j, let αjSj denote the scaled version of Sj , i.e., αjSj := {(αjw, y) : (w, y) ∈ Sj}.
Set S =
{
(1, y1), . . . , (1, yt−1)
} ∪⋃j≤N αjSj .
Set S′ =
{(⌊
w|S|/⌋, y) : (w, y) ∈ S}.
Play xt = INTOPT(S′).
Observe yt and receive payoff f(xt, yt).
end for
As an immediate corollary, we obtain that the existence of a pseudo polynomial-time offline oracle
implies the existence of polynomial-time online learner with regret O(
√
T ), whenever we have access to
an implementable and admissible matrix. The following is an immediate consequence of Theorem 2.5 used
with pseudo-polynomial oracles.
Corollary H.2. Assume that Γ ∈ [0, 1]|X |×N is implementable with pseudo-complexity W and (κ, δ)-
admissible, and there exists an approximate offline oracle OPT(·, 1√
T
) which runs in time poly(W,T ), when
given as input a dataset with pseudo-complexity W . Let D be a uniform distribution over [0, 1/η] for η
defined as in Theorem 2.5. Then Algorithm 2 runs in time poly(T,N,W, 1η ) and achieves cumulative regret
O(N
√
Tκ/δ).
In Appendix H.4, we provide the pseudo-complexity of implementing matrices that are used for the
applications we discuss in this work.
H.2 Integral Oracles
In the main body of the paper, we considered having access to an oracle OPT that takes as input a real-
weighted dataset and an approximation parameter . In this section, we focus on a seemingly more restricted
oracle, INTOPT, that only takes integer-weighted datasets. We show that all of our results in Section 2 extend
to using INTOPT as an oracle.
Definition H.3 (Integral Offline Oracle). An integral offline oracle INTOPT receives as input a set of adver-
sary actions with non-negative integer weights S = {(w`, y`)}`∈L, w` ∈ N, y` ∈ Y , and returns
INTOPT(S) ∈ arg max
x∈X
∑
(w,y)∈S
wf(x, y).
We show that INTOPT can be used to implement a real-weighted oracle OPT. This implies that online
learning can be efficiently reduced to offline optimization with INTOPT oracles under the same conditions
as studied in Section 2. At the crux of our approach is a construction of an approximate real-weighted oracle
from an integral oracle. Then, the Oracle-based Generalized FTPL algorithm (Algorithm 2) can use INTOPT
to solve the optimization task within  = 1√
T
accuracy, i.e., to construct OPT(·, 1√
T
). The construction of
this dataset is proved in the next lemma, and the resulting algorithm is demonstrated in Algorithm 4.
Lemma H.4 (Integral Offline Oracle to Offline Oracle). Given any real-weighted dataset S, any precision
parameter  > 0, and an integral offline oracle INTOPT, let
S′ =
{(⌊
w|S|/⌋, y) : (w, y) ∈ S} .
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For all x ∈ X , we have ∑
(w,y)∈S
wf(INTOPT(S′), y) ≥
∑
(w,y)∈S
wf(x, y)− .
Proof. Let δ = /|S|. Thus, elements (w, y) ∈ S are transformed into (bw/δc, y) ∈ S′. To show the
approximate optimality, we use the fact that 0 ≤ a−bac ≤ 1 for any a ≥ 0, so we have 0 ≤ w−δbw/δc ≤ δ
and thus for any x ∈ X ,
∑
(w,y)∈S
wf(INTOPT(S′), y) ≥ δ
∑
(w,y)∈S
bw/δcf(INTOPT(S′), y)
= δ
∑
(w′,y)∈S′
w′f(INTOPT(S′), y) (by construction)
≥ δ
∑
(w′,y)∈S′
w′f(x, y) (by the property of INTOPT)
≥
∑
(w,y)∈S
(w − δ)f(x, y)
≥
∑
(w,y)∈S
wf(x, y)−
∑
(w,y)∈S
δ
=
∑
(w,y)∈S
wf(x, y)− .
There are two general approaches to calling INTOPT on a dataset S′ created in Algorithm 4. The first
approach is to use the binary representation of the weight w′ =
⌊
w|S|/⌋ of each action of the adversary.
In this case, blowing up the weight of a point from (w, y) ∈ S to (w′, y) ∈ S′ adds log(T ) additional
computation. In the second approach, an integral oracle may be implemented by replicating each example
according to its weight w′. Here, a natural input size of the oracle is the total weight used in the dataset.
In this case, blowing up the weight of a point from (w, y) ∈ S to (w′, y) ∈ S′ adds O(T ) additional
computation.
We summarize the results in this section in the following theorem:
Theorem H.5. Let Γ be a (κ, δ)-admissible matrix with N columns and let D be the uniform distribution
on [0, 1/η] for η =
√
δ/(2Tκ(1 + 2)). If  = 1√
T
, Algorithm 4 ensures
REGRET ≤ O(N
√
Tκγ/δ).
Furthermore, if Γ is implementable with real-weighted datasets in per-round complexity g(N,T ), then Al-
gorithm 4 is oracle-efficient with respect to INTOPT, with per-round complexity poly(log(T ), g(N,T )). If
Γ is implementable with real-weighted dataset in per-round pseudo-complexity g(N,T ), then Algorithm 4
is oracle-efficient with respect to INTOPT, with per-round pseudo-complexity poly(T, g(N,T )).
H.3 A Note on Numerical Computations
As we noted earlier, for ease of exposition we have assumed that all numerical computations takeO(1) time.
In a closer look, it is clear that invoking the oracles with real-weighted datasets require communicating the
weights, which may have unbounded description length. As we described in Appendix H.2 this problem can
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Problem Class Matrix Pseudo-complexity Section
VCG with bidder-specific reserves ΓVCG O(m2) 3.1
envy free item pricing ΓIP O(m2) 3.2
level auction ΓSL 1 3.3
multi-unit welfare maximization ΓMU 1 7.1
SiSPAs ΓOB m 7.2
Table 3: The pseudo-complexity of datasets that implement translation matrices for our applications.
be circumvented by discretizing real weights within an appropriate accuracy level of  = 1√
T
before invoking
OPT. This causes an additional  = 1√
T
additive approximation factor in the accuracy of the outcome of the
oracle. Therefore, the overall regret of the algorithms remain asymptotically the same, while the per-round
complexity may increase by an additional small factor of log(T ). When we consider pseudo-polynomial
oracle, the pseudo-complexity of the dataset increases by value 1 = O(
√
T ), which is still polynomial in T .
H.4 Pseudo-Complexity of Applications
Recall from the definition of implementability (Definition H.1) that Γ is said to be implementable with
pseudo-complexityW if it is implementable by sets Sj , j ∈ [N ] such that |Sj | ≤W and
∑
(w,y)∈Sj w ≤W .
In this section, we provide the pseudo-complexity of implementing matrices that are used by the applica-
tions in this work. See Table 3 for a summary of these results. Throughout this section, note that m is the
discretization level used for the problem class.
VCG with bidder-specific reserves We show that the pseudo-complexity of implementing ΓVCG isO(m2).
Recall that we used datasets Sj for each column j ≤ ndlog(m)e that included the m bid profiles
in which only the bidder corresponding to column j (call it bidder i) has non-zero valuation, denoted as
vh := (h/m)ei for h ≤ m. We used Sj = {wh,vh}h∈[m] to implement Γ, where
wm = max
{
0, max
z
[
m
(
zβ − (z − 1)β
)]}
,
and for all z = m,m− 1, . . . , 2,
wz−1 =
1
z − 1
(
m∑
h=z
wh −m
(
zβ − (z − 1)β
))
.
We show that
∑m
z=1wz ≤ 2m(m−1)+m. Note that by definitionwm ≤ m. Moreover, by the definition
of wz−1, we have
wz−1 =
1
z − 1
(
m∑
h=z
wh −m
(
zβ − (z − 1)β
)) ≤ 1
z − 1
(
m∑
h=z
wh +m
)
.
Reformulating the above, we have
(z − 1)wz−1 =
m∑
h=z
wh −m
(
zβ − (z − 1)β
) ≤ m∑
h=z
wh +m ≤
m−1∑
h=z
wh + 2m.
Next, we sum over the above inequality for z = 2, . . . ,m. We have,
m∑
z=2
(z − 1)wz−1 ≤
m∑
z=2
(
m−1∑
h=z
wh + 2m
)
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=m∑
z=2
m−1∑
h=z
wh + 2m(m− 1)
=
m−1∑
h′=2
(h′ − 1)wh′ + 2m(m− 1)
=
m∑
h′=3
(h′ − 2)wh′−1 + 2m(m− 1),
where the penultimate transition is by rearranging the summation and counting the number of times each
wh′ appears in the sum. Subtracting the two sides and changing parameter z ← z − 1, we get
m−1∑
z=1
wz ≤ 2m(m− 1).
The claim is proved by using the fact that wm ≤ m.
Envy free item pricing As we showed in Appendix C.3, as far as the implementability of ΓIP is concerned,
this setting is isomorphic to the case of VCG with bidder-specific prices. So, the pseudo-complexity of
implementing ΓIP is also O(m2).
Level Auctions Recall that the datasets used for implementing ΓSL is in the form of Sv = {(1,v)} for
v ∈ V , where V is defined for each class individually in Section 3.3. Therefore, ΓSL is implementable with
pseudo-complexity of 1.
Multi-unit Welfare Maximization Recall that ΓMU is implemented by sets Sj = {(1,vj)} for some vj .
Therefore, ΓMU is implementable with pseudo-complexity of 1.
Online Bidding in SiSPAs Recall that ΓOB is implemented by datasets Sj = {wj` ,pj`}`∈[m] for all j ∈ [k],
where
wj` =
{
1
m · 1v(ej)−`/m if `/m < v(ej)
0 otherwise.
Since v(ej) ∈ {0, 1/m, . . . ,m/m}, we have that wj` ≤ 1. Moreover, |Sj | ≤ m. Therefore, Γ is imple-
mentable with pseudo-complexity m.
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